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List 3, Sheet 5 
No. 82-940 
HISHON (female attorney denied 
partnership} 
v. 
KING AND SPALDING 
(Jidwetf 
Motion of women's Bar Association of 
Illinois for Leave to File a Brief as 
Amicus curiae 
Motion of Connecticut WOmen's 
Educational and Legal FUnd, Inc., 
et al. for Leave to File a Brief as 
Amici curiae 
SUHMARY: Amici move for leave to file amicus briefs in supp::>rt of petr. 
FACTS: This case presents the question of whether Title VII applies to 
alleged discrimination in a law firm's decision to deny promotion of a female 
associate to partnership, and to its decision to discharge her from 
employment. The Connecticut Women's Educational and Legal Fund, Inc., et al., 
and the v~men's Bar Association of Illinois filed motions on January 7 and 10, 
1983, respectively, for leave to file amicus briefs in supp::>rt of petr. 
DISCUSSION: Although amicus briefs were due January 3, 1983 under Rule 
36.1, the briefs should be helpful to the Court. I recommend that both 
motions be granted. 
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January 21, 1983 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 4 
No. 8 2-940 
HISHON (woman denied 
partnership) 
Cert to CAll (Tjoflat, Fay, 
Young [DJ]) (Tjoflat, diSS} 
v. 
KING & SPALDING (law firm) Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr claims Title VII applies to 
~discrimination inv;romotion-to-partnership decisions and the 
discharge of associates denied partnership. 
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Resp is a law firm with some 
50 active partners and 50 associates. Partnership decisions are 
made after the sixth year of association with the firm, and those 
~ \:.. ~ ~ \.A/) ~ 
~lb.~+ -h ~~- ~~ t1~1'L 
- 2 -
denied partnership are discharged under the , firm's up-or-out 
policy. Petr is a female attorney hired by resp as an associate 
in 1972. She was denied partnership in 1979. 
Petr filed a three-count complaint alleging sex 
discrimination in violation of~tle VII and the Equal Pay Act, 
and a breach of contract. The DC (ND Ga: Edenfield) dismissed 
the case under Fed.R.Civ.P 12 (b) (1). Concerned with resp 's 
constitutional right to freedom of association, the DC construed 
Title VII as not covering partnership decisions. 
~1 affirmed. First, the court rejected the claim that 
large partnerships should be treated like corporations, so that 
its partners are considered "employees" for purposes of Title 
VII. CAll declined to adopt an "economic reality" test for 
~ determining whether partners are employees, the test adopted in 
NLRB v. Hearst Publications Co., 322 u.s. 111 (1944), for 
determining who are "employees" under the NLRA. CAll denied its 
decision exalted form over substance, and declared that the 
partnership form is the substance of the issue. 
CAll found support from Burke v. Friedman, 556 F·.2d 867 
(CA7), which held that partners were not employees in concluding 
that an accounting firm with 4 partners and 13 non-partners was 
not within Title VII jurisdiction, which requires 15 employees. 
CAll discounted the SC's statement in Bellis v. United States, 
417 u.s. 85, 95 (1974) (individual partner's Fifth Amendment 
privilege held no bar to production of partnership records), that 
?artnerships have "an established institutional identity 
independent of its individual partners." Equally inapplicable, 
- j -
concluded CAll, is the SC decision in Goldb~rg v. Whittaker House 
Cooperative, Inc., 366 u.s. 28 (1961), which held that a 
cooperative is an "employer" and its members are "employees" 
within the meaning of the FLSA. 
Second, CAll rejected the argument that resp's promise of 
partnership for satisfactory work was a "term, condition or 
privilege of employment" protected by §703 (a) (1) and/or an 
"employment opportunity" protected by §703 (a) (2). The court had 
"no quarrel" with the premise that an "opportunity" can include 
promotion to a position beyond that of an "employee" covered by 
Title VII, but declined to extend the meaning beyond its intended 
context by encroaching upon individuals' decisions voluntarily to 
associate in a business partnership. The court noted that an 
action in breach of contract or misrepresentation may be a more 
appropriate vehicle for a legal remedy. 
Finally, CAll rejected petr 's "back-door attempt'' to find 
Title VII coverage in her argument that her discharge for failure 
to make partner was a loss of employment covered by Title VII. 
When termination is a result of the partnership decision, 
concluded CAll, termination loses its separate identity and must 
fall prey to the same ill fate as her original attempt to apply 
Title VII to partnership decisions. 
Judge Tjoflat dissented. Regardless of whether the action 
is phrased as a rejection of partnership followed by the 
incidental discharge from the firm, or phrased as a decision to 
fire making petr ineligible for partnership, the decision was, 
undeniably, to discharge petr. Thus, while Title VII would not 
- 4 -
apply to the discrete decision whether to take on a new partner 
(or a lateral invitation to partnership made to non-associates), 
Title VII does apply when the partnership decision inextricably 
and inevitably is a decision whether to terminate employment. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr, following the arguments rejected by 
CAll, suggests that Title VII applies to partnership decisions 
under three distinct legal theories. First, under the entity 
theory, a large partnership is a separate legal entity from its 
partners and should be considered the employer of the partners. 
Second, as a "term, condition or privilege of employment," 
partnership decisions are forbidden under Title VII from being 
based on sex. CAll failed to explain how a promotion decision 
could support a breach of contract or misrepresentation claim 
without supporting a claim for denial of a privilege of 
employment under Title VII. Third, under the "up or out" policy, 
the firm simultaneously decided to terminate her employment and 
deny partnership. The effect of this decision was to "deprive 
[petr] of employment opportunities [and] otherwise directly 
affect [petr 's] status as an employee" of resp, in violation of 
the literal language of §703 (a) (2) of Title VII. 
CAll's rejection of these theories goes against the teaching 
of County of washington v. Gunther, 452 u.s. 161, 178 (1981), 
where the Court instructed that the lower federal courts "must 
therefore avoid interpretations of Title VII that deprive victims 
of discrimination of a remedy, without a clear congressional 
mandate." There can be no doubt Congress in tended Title VI I to 
- 5 -
reach all forms of job discrimination, inc1uding the employment 
practices of partnerships. "Partnership" is expressly included 
in the definition of the term "employer" in §70l(a). Moreover, 
when Congress enacted Title VII, it used the same broad 
definitions of the terms "employer" and "employee" used in the 
NLRA, the SOcial Security Act, and the FLSA; The Court declared 
in NLRB v. Hearst Publications that the applicability of the term 
employee "is to be determined broadly, in doubtful situations, by 
underlying economic facts rather than technically and exclusively 
by previously established legal classifications." 322 u.s., at 
128-29. In Golberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, decided only 
three years before the passage of Title VII, the Court held that 
an "owner" of a cooperative could also be considered an 
"employee" if the economic reality of the relationship was that 
she worked for the organization. It is well established that 
when Congress uses the same term in a later statute as in earlier 
statutes, it is presumed that Congress was aware of SC 
interpretations of the earlier statute. See, e.g., Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979) • Finally, petr 
notes that CAll's interpretation conflicts with the position of 
the EEOC, as enunciated in its amicus brief before CAll. 
Resp notes there is no circuit conflict as to whether Title 
VII applies to a partnership's determinations regarding its 
partners. Indeed, the only other CA to consider whether partners 
are "employees" of a partnership under Title VII, Burke v. 
Friedman (CA7), has concluded they are not employees. Resp 
acknowledges that the SDNY went the other way on this precise 
- 6 -
issue in Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, . 425 F .Supp. 12 3 (SDNY 
1977) (claim of national origin and religion discrimination in 
partnership decision). 
Resp also defends the CAll decision on the merits, 
characterizing a contrary result that would treat a partnership 
as a corporation for Title VII purposes as judicial legislation. 
The question of whether Title VII governs admission to 
partnership cannot reasonably be isolated from the broader 
question of whether Title VII applies to all aspects of the 
partners' relations among themselves. There is no legislative 
history that Congress intended such a result. 
4. DISCUSSION: 
'- CAll probably decided 
-z 
I think ~ is' an important question that 
wrongly. I agree with a basic charge of 
petr that the CAll opinion is largely ipse dixit. Under Judge 
Tjoflat's intertwined partner/discharge theory, or the "privilege 
of employment" theory, the language of Title VII would appear to 
cover this situation. Although neither side points to any 
relevant legislative history beyond the remark of Senator Clark 
that "employer" was to have a common, dictionary definition, a 
holding that this form of job discrimination is covered by Title 
VII w~ accord with the generally broad intent of Congress. 
Note, Applicability of Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation to 
the Selection of a Law Partner, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 282 (1977), and 
Note, Tenure and Partnership as Title VII Remedies, 94 Harv. L. 
Rev. 457 (1980), both conclude that Title VII covers such claims. 
-----.. 
The strongest argument against review is the lack of 
conflict among the CAs. Although several cases have held that 
Title VII covers employment discrimination in the hiring of 
associates, this is the first CA opinion addressing the 
partnership issue. The SONY in Lucido did go the other way in 
holding that Title VII covers promotion-to-partnership 
decisions. 1 
Although the Court may well have to decide this issue 
someday, I recommend waiting for a circuit conflict. 
There is a response. 
January 13, 1983 Schwab opns in petn 
1one possible procedural problem is that the DC discussed only 
the Title VII claim in dismissing the 3-count complaint. 
Although the closing sentence in the DC's opinion states that the 
court has "no subject-matter jurisdiction of plaintiff's claim 
and the case is, therefore, Dismissed," it is possible that the 
DC meant to deal only with the Title VII count. If the other 
counts remained live, Fed.R.Civ.P 54(b} should have barred an 
appeal to the CA. CAll recognized this problem in a footnote, 
but noted that petr's brief and a letter to the panel revealed 
that the other counts "have been informally withdrawn and 
dismissed by plaintiff without prejudice." Resp does not raise 
this point as a bar to review, and apparently did not raise it 
below. 
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KING AND SPALDING 
Motion of Petitioner to 
Unseal Record 
SUH11ARY: Petr moves that this Court unseal the record in this case. 
Both the DC and the CA sealed the record on request of the parties and it was 
received by the Clerk's Office in a sealed condition. Both sides apparently 
agree that there is no longer any need for sealing. 
FACTS: The Court granted cert on this case on January 24, 1983. The 
case raises the question of whether Title VII applies to a law firm's decision 
to deny partnership to a female associate and its decision to discharge her. 
At the request of the parties the DC (ND, Ga., Edenfield) ordered the 
record sealed.l Following dismissal of petr's complaint by the DC, the record 
was forwarded to the CA 11 under seal. Thereafter the CA 11, on resp's 
~rntion, placed all briefs under seal. 
Thr record was received by the Clerk's Office in a sealed condition. 
Jlowever, on !'iarch 2, both the resp and the petr moved the CA 11 to unseal the 
record so that counsPl and amici might have unfettPred access. On March 16, 
IThe order apparently resulted from a desire to keep certain law firm 
records confidential. 
-
the CA 11 denied the motion, referring to a letter (dated Feb. 28) from the 
clerk of that court to Mr. Stevas. That letter (app'd) states that theCA 
ll's clerk had permitted the parties and their representatives access to the 
record for purposes of preparing the joint appendix. 
Petr now moves this Court to unseal the record. 
CONTENTIONS: Petr argues that the sealed condition of the record is 
hampering efforts by amici to prepare their briefs and has also delayed 
preparation of the joint appendix. 
DISCUSSION: In view of the parties' mutual desire to unseal the record 
and permit access by other individuals, the motion should be granted. 
There is no response. 
3/23/83 
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David A. Charny October 25, 1983 
Question Presented 
Whether title VII applies to a law firm's decision not to 






A. Partners as Ernployess 5 
B. Liability Premised upon Petr's Status as an Associate 12 
c. Rights of Association 15 
III. Conclusion 21 
I. Background 
Petr is an attorney employed by resp law firm. Petr 
worked for resp from the time of her graduation from law school 
until . l979, when resp decided not to invite petr to join the 
partnership. Shortly thereafter, under the firm's established 
policy, petr's association with the firm was ended. 
Petr filed a grievance with the EEOC, alleging that the 
decision no r to invite her to join the partnership was made on 
account of petr's sex. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter, 
and petr filed suit in the district court. 
Before the courts below, as before this Court, petr 
pressed three theories of title VII liability. First, because 
the partners were employed by the partnership as an entity, title 
VII applied to the partnership's decision not to "hire" her as a 
partner. ~ by discriminatorily depriving petr of her op-
portunity to join the partnership, the partners discriminated 
against petr in a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment 
and discriminatorily "classif[ied]" petr in a "way which would 
adversely affect [her] status as an employee." 42 u.s.c. § 
2000e-2 (c) (1), (2). Third, the partners discriminated against 
petr by terminating her employment as an associate¢ on the basis 
o~ the discriminatory decision not to invite her to join the 
partnership. 
After preliminary discovery, the DC dismissed for want 
of jurisdiction. The DC first concluded that King and Spalding 
was undoubtedly a partnership under state law and a pa~ership in 
r--- 1\ 
the sense of a voluntary association. The DC therefore decided 
that petr did not deserve a further opp~rtunity to prove that the 
partnership really functioned as an entity which employed lawyers 
under the label "partners" and denied petr's request to discovery 
such matters as the capital contribution required of resp's part-
ners, the amount of the firm surplus and the interest of the 
partners in it, the division of income among the partners. 
Reaching the question whether title VII applied to law 
'-' 
h ' h h d h h I( ' ' partners 1ps, t e DC el t at t e freedom of assoc1at1on was 
implicated by government regulation of decisions as to the mem-
berships in professional partnership. The court found the lan-
guage of title VII "confused" on the question whether the terms 
of the act extended to partnerships. The one circuit to have 
considered the issue had held that partnerships were not covered, ___...., 
t_'A1 Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977); the court dis-
,......, 
tinguished Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), as dealing with discharge of an associate, not 
an invitation to join a partnership. The DC concluded that, be-
cause the coverage of the Act was unclear, while the right to 
freedom of association as well established, the Act should be 
construed not to apply to law partnerships. 
The CA 5 affirmed. It rejected petr's argument that the 
partners at King & Spalding were in actuality employees of a cor-
poration, noting that King & Spalding met the criteria for part-
nership established by Georgia law. The court concluded that 
"partners" were not "employees" under title VII, because partners 
are joint co-owners who have voluntarily pooled their assets for 
a common business venture. The court further rejected petr's 
contention that the opportunity to join , the partnership was a 
"term, condition, or privilege of employment" or an "employment 
/f 
oppo,~tuni ty" covered by section 703. Partnerhsip is . not employ-;~ 
ment within the meaning of the Act, and Lso cannot be an emptoy- ~ 
ment opportunity. With regard to the definition of term or con-
dition of employment, the court simply asserted that "decisions 
as to who will be partners are not within the protection of Title 
VII." Finally, the court held that the termination of petr's 
employment following the decision not to make her a partner was 
simply a consequence of the partnership decison and therefore not 
covered by the Act. 
Judge Tjoflat, dissenting, would have accepted petr's 
third argument. In the present case, "the partnership decision 




A. Partners as employees 
Title VII itself makes no attempt to define "employ," 
"employer," or "employee." 1 The legislative history offers two 
guides to the interpretation of "employment" and related terms. 
First, the terms are to be given their "common dictionary mean-
ing." 110 Cong. Rec. 7216 (1964). Second, the House Report 
notes that the terms "are defined ••. in the manner common for 
1Although section 703(a) (1) refers to an employer's decision to 
"refuse to hire •.• any individual," petr does not contend that 
the use of the term "individual" rather than "employee" extends 
the Act to cover individuals other than employees. 
Federal statutes." H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 
I 
(1963), at 27. 
The common meaning of employment suggests that partner-
ships are not covered by the statute. Under the common law, the 
partners are co-owners of an enterprise carried on by them as a 
joint venture. See generally Crane and Bromberg, Law of Partner-
ship, § 3. It makes little sense to consider partners employees 
of a venture they own and manage. Of course, for some purposes, 
the 
the 
partnership is considered an independent entity separate fro~ 
partners. Rarely, however, does this conception to treating 
the partners as employees of the partnership. The Uniform Part-
nership Act contains no such provision; and only a ;andful~:tes 
A 
consider a partner an employee under workmen's compensation stat-
utes, usually where special provision for such coverage is made 
by statute. See Note, Applicability of Federal Antidiscrimina-
tion Legislation to the Selection of a Law Partner, 76 Mich. L. 
Rev. 282, 286 n. 33 (1977). 
The application of the term "employee" in other federal 
statutes supports this interpretation. A partner is not an em-
ployee under the ~ir Labor Standards Act, 29 u.s.c. §§ 201-219. 
See Alpenstein v. Irwin B. Foster & Sons Sportswear Co., 193 F. 
Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1961). Partners are not employees under the 
~ocial Security Act, and indeed were not covered by the Act even -----------------
7 before it was amended (as discussed below) to incorporate explic-
itly the common law definition of employment. See U.S. v. Whole-
sale Oil Co., 154 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1946) . 2 
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages. 
Petr does not contend that all partners at common law 
I 
should be be considered "employees" under title VII. Rather, 
petr proposes that an inquiry into the "economic realities" of 
the King & Spalding firm will show that it is not a partnership 
in the common law sense, but rather an entity (otherwise unde-
fined) that employs employees whom it labels "partners." 
Again, this argument finds little support either in the 
common usage of the term "employ" or in the use of the term in 
other federal statutes. Petr does not cite a single case, under 
any federal or state labor statutes, where those who conducted 
their business in the partnership form have been considered em-
'- ~-
ployees. Indeed, the state courts have intended to accept the 
partnership label even where it was apparently adopted in order 
to avoid application of a state statute governing "employee" re-
lations. See Kershnar v. Heller, 14 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 
1939): Angelos v. Mesevich, 289 N.Y. 498, 46 N.E.2d 903, rev'd on 
other grounds, 320 u.s. 293 (1943). 
2Bellis v. United States, 417 u.s. 85 (1974), the one case 
decided by this Court that might support the "entity" theory of 
partnership, makes sense only in the unique context of the fifth 
amendment. The essential premise of that decision is that the 
fifth amendment privilege "should be 'limited to its historic 
function of protecting only the natural individual from 
compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal 
records.'" rd., at 89-90. Partnership records, as records 
possessed jointly by the partners, see id., at 98, are thus not 
"purely personal" in the sense required--sy the fifth amendment, 
which may not be invoked by an "articifical organization." Id. 
And in Bellis, the petr held the records solely as representative 
of the partnership, not because of any personal claim to them. 
In any event, even if a partnership is treated as an "entity" for 
some purposes, this does not imply that the partners are 
"employees" of that entity. 
Further, the fact that resp has modified common law 
I 
rules governing some aspects of the partnership's business should 
make no difference to determination of the partners' status. 
The partnership agreement itself is adopted as an exercise of the 
partners' rights as owners of their jointly owned assets or man-
agers of the partnership business. See Uniform Partnership Act, 
§ 18. The Bellis case, upon which petr heavily relies, recog-
nizes that whether the partnership is treated as an entity does 
not depend upon whether the partners have modified the rules for 
partnership governance supplied by the common law or by statute. 
See 417 u.s., at 96. 
Finally, petr contends that cases under the federal 
labor statutes, including those under title VII, have tended to 
\..J ./extend the scope of the term "employee" by ignoring the distinc-
~~ tions recognized at common law between employees and other entre-
~ preneurs such as partners and independent contractors. Petr 
cites NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 u.s. 111 (1944) (National 
Labor Relations Act); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947) 
(Social Security Act); and Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coopera-
tive, Inc., 366 u.s. 28 (1961) (Fair Labor Standards Act). 
It is true that these cases urge examination of "eco--
nomic realities" to determine whether an individual is an employ-
~ Howeve::-both Hearst Publications and Silk were explicitly 
~ overruled by Congress, which indicated soon after the decisions 
issued that they intended "employee" under the relevant statutes 
to be determined by reference to th See NLRB v. 
United Insurance Co., 390 u.s. 254, 
cussing Hearst)~ United States v. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. 179, 183-
188 (1970). Congress expressed its discontent with an approach 
that abandoned "established standards of law" for "dimensionless 
and amorphous abstraction." See Webb, 397 U.S., at 188. This 
concern is equally applicable to title VII. 
Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., is not 
precedent for a different~ The Fair Labor Standards Act, 
unlike title VII and the other acts discussed above, does contain 
an explicit definition of "employ" -- to "suffer or permit to 
work" -- intended to be broader in scope than the common law of 
employment. See 366 u.s., at 32. Further, the Court described 
the cooperative association at issue in the case as a "device ••• 
too transparent to survive the statutory definition of 'employ'" 
and emphasized that the workers in question had a duties and 
privileges in relation to the cooperative identical to that they 
would have as employees of an individual proprietor. Whitaker at 
best supports the undeniable proposition that an entity could not 
evade the application of title VII merely by calling its employ-
ees "partners" without adopting the substance of a partnership 
relationship. 
Against this background, it is not surprising that most 
courts have adopted ~ommon law distinctions to define "employee" -
under title VII, except where the language or legislative history 
expressly indicates that a certain economic relationship is "em-
ployment." Armbruster v. Quinn, 498 F. Supp. 858, 86-861 (D.C. 
Mich 1980) ~ Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513, 516-
517 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd 580 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1976) ~ Burke v. 
Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1~77). See also Spirides 
v. reinhardt, 486 F. Supp. 685, 687 (D.D.C. 1980) (examining com-
mon law status and status under federal tax and social security 
statutes) • 
More generally, Congress arguably intended in this case 
a more expansive definition of "employment" because the purposes 
of anti-discrimination laws are to provide equally to all indi-
viduals the opportunity to work, regardless of the discriminatory 
preferences of others. Society as well as the affected individ-
uals~ individual's opportunities to work are determined 
1\ 
according to his abilities, not extraneous factors such as race. 
See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 u.s. 792, 801 
(1973); Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 u. Chic. L. 
Rev. 235, 249-253 (1971). Accordingly, it would be argued, title 
VII should apply whenever the opportunity to work is in question, 
regardless of the legal definition of the work relationship, be 
it that of employment, partnership, membership in a cooperative, 
or proprietorship. 
This argument ignors the point that there are costs to 
--------------------------
enforcing an anti-discrimination law which Congress and the 
courts have considered in defining the law's scope. __ For example, 
too rigorous enforcement of title VII may have a chilling effect -
on the exercise of sound judgment in choosing one's employees or 
~ colleagues, particularly where these judgments are based on intu-
~ itions that are difficu t to defend in court, or on confidential 
/ ~~facts. See, e.g. o Each According to His Ability, From 
~~ None According to The Concept of Merit in the Law of 
Antidiscrimination, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 815, 855 (1980). That it 
I 
seems desirable to root out discrimination does not mean that an 
anti-dscrimination law should be given the maximum conceivable 
application. The debate in Congress on title VII focused on two 
issues: the economic plight of the blacks, on the one hand, and 
the impact of the law of freedom of association and the free con-
duct of business enterprises, on the other. In~~g4title 
VII to apply to employment relationships, Congress made a deter-
mination that the benefits of applying an anti-discrimination law 
to employment -- but not to other economic relationships -- out-
weigh the costs of such regulation. If the language of the stat-
ute gives no indication that Congress made a similar determina-
tion for partnerships or other economic relationships, this Court 
is not free to strike a different balance by giving an expansive 
definition to "employment" that the common meaning of the word 
will not bear and that the legislative history will not support. 
I would conclude that the courts consider "partners" to 
employees under title VII only where partnership form has been 
adopted to evade federal regulation and where the "partners" en-
rights and privileges of partnership. No elabo-
rate inquiry is necessary in a case such as the present one, 
where it is apparent from the history and structure of the enter-
----~~ ~-------------------------prise that it is i tbona fide partnershi~~ The information that 
petr sought to discover concerning the detailed operation of the 
partnership is superfluous. A multitude of arrangements governing 
profit-sharing and management are consistent with partnership at 
common law. It is characteristic of partnership that the part-
ners are largely free to agree to conduct their business as they 
I 
will. 
A troublesome case for this approach is the one of a 
vast partnership, where the partners take no real part in the --conduct of the business, receive a fixed salary as compensation 
and in general do not display the traditional aspect of a partner 
at common law. The large accounting firms provide an example. 
It might be argued that partners should be treated as employees 
when the partnership is so large that no small group of partners 
can conceivably exert a direct influence on the management of the 
business or the selection of other partners. The courts are free 
to develop such a rule, as they are free to disregard merely 
"sham" partnerships. But this issue does not arise here, be-
cause it can probably be concluded even on the basis of the 
record that King & Spalding is not such a partnership. 
B. Liability Premised on 1 ~etr's Status as an Associate 
l' 
Petr~kes two arguments based on her status as an asso-
( t:Ht.. ~· .. i ~> 
ciate. First~ partnership decision discriminated against 
petr with regard to a "term, condition, or privilege" of her em-
ployment as an associate and "classified" her as an associate on 
the basis of sex. Second, because petr's employment terminates 
when she is declined for partnership, a partnership decision 
based on sex results in discharge based on sex. 
Each of these arguments has some merit. The SG's brief 
I I 
quite persuasively explains that the opportunity to be invited to 
, .. 
join may constitute a central incentive for law-
yers to become associated with a firm and may provide the central 
criterion for evaluation of the associa~e. Further, title VII 
undeniably applies to benefits conferred at the end of a term of 
employment such as pensions, e.g., Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich 
Co., 541 F.2d 1040, 1042 (4th Cir. 1976), while, by analogy to 
cases decided under the National Labor Relations Act, title VII 
would be applicable to "promotion" from employment statuj s to 
positions not themselves covered by title VII. Cf. Golden State 
Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 188 (1973). 
Nonetheless, "promotion" to partnership may not be anal- F 
ogous to these cases. The opportunity to become a partner is not 
made available primarily as a kind of "bonus" designed to prod -----associates on to greater efforts; nor is it, unlike a pension, 
---------~--------------
simply a form of delayed compensation. More generally, a part-
nership opportunity may not be a term or condition of employment 
in that the purpose or design of the status of partnership is 
not, directly or indirectly, to provide compensation for asso-
ciates or an incentive for better work by them. Rather, the law 
firm traditionally employed associates to identify and train law-
yers qualified eventually to assume the status of partnership. 3 
(In contrast, it could not be argued that the primary purpose of 
employing factory workers is to be able to pay them bonuses upon 
retirement or to promote them to foreman positions.) In this 
3This will not always be the case. At more and more large 
firms, associates join the firm with no serious of intention of 
attempting to join the partnership. But petr's arguments would 
then have no application at all: for such associates, the 
opportunity to join the partnership can hardly be a term, 
condition, or privilege of employment. 
sense, p~r's ~~s su~je~ar~nership decisions to ~ 
title VII "through the back door." For once it is conceded that 
~=------=--~  
title VII does not apply directly to the decision to invite an 
individual to join the partnership, it seems slightly anomalous 
to apply title VII simply because conferring associate status is 
part of the process by which the law firm makes the partnership 
decision. Title VII would not ~£;zY if the firm simp~ invited a 
(-'.~· ~~p4+M.c ...... ~
lawyer to join the partnership; but it would apply if the f1rm ~-
....,..J~ 
invited a lawyer to join the firm as an associate with the expec-
tation that he would later become a partner. 4 
Although this is a close question, it appears that petr 
has the better of this argument simply as a matter of statutory 
construction. Associates are clearly employees. Congress's 
L~-----~ ~--------------
broad language -- "terms, conditions, or privileges" -- would 
mean in the present case that if a law firm had a system of se-
lecting new partners which included first employing them as asso-
ciates, then the law firm could not discriminate in partnership 
selection. I would concede that the statute could bear the oppo-
site construction, however: a term or condition of employment, or 
a classification adversely affecting employment, would be one 
attached to the status of employee either to serve as an incen-
tive or a compensation for work done while an employee or in some 
4Petr's third argument also confuses the purposes of associate 
status with one of the peripheral effects of this purpose. Petr 
loses employment after the partnership decision is made because 
the purpose of the employment -- to determine the qualifications 
of the associate for partnership -- has been accomplished. 
way to regulate the conduct of employees. Because the partner-, 
ship decision primarily serves a very different purpose, it would 
not fall within these statutory terms. Either approach is con-
sistent with the statutory language and legislative history. 
And, as I shall discuss, rights of association might provide a 
ter approach. 
courts below propose that title VII should 
be interpreted not to apply to partnership decisions to avoid 
constitutional questions as to infringement upon rights of asso-
ciation. ,, ~ 
The right of association was first declared to protect 
the right of association to promote association to further one's 
ideas and beliefs. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 u.s. 
449 {1958). In a line of cases culminating invin re Primus, 436 
u.s. 412 {1978), the Court has indicated that "collective activi-
ty undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fun-
damental right within the protection of the first amendment." 
!d., at 422 {quoting United Transportation Union v. Michigan Bar, 
401 u.s. 576, 585 {1971)). See Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar 
Assn., 389 u.s. 217, 222 {1967); Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia 
Bar, 377 U.S. 1, ~1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 
{1963). See also Bates v. Arizona Bar, 433 u.s. 350, 376 n. 32 
{1977) {"Underlying [these cases] was the Court's concern that 
the aggrieved receive information regarding their legal rights 
and the means of effectuating them.") These cases protect the 
right of lawyers to act on their --------
clients and advising them as to how to vindicate their rights; 
I • 
and they protect the right of non-legal organizations to advise 
and assist their members in consulting lawyers. But if the first 




~ection as well to the collective association of lawyers ~ 
~~ef:ectiv~id_th:! r client~ the assertion of legal _ 
~ e/" :=aims. 
Another line of right of association cases might also 
support resp's position. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 u.s. 7 
479 (1965), the Court recognized that the first amendment created 
a more general right of association, including such matters as 
freedom of association in intimate relations and in decisions 
about schooling. "'Freedom to associate and privacy in one's 
associations" establishes a "privacy protected from govern-
mental intrusion," protecting "forms of 'association' that are 
not political in the customary sense but pertain to the social, 
legal and economic benefit of the members ..•• " A law partner-
ship may, for reasons considered below, constitute such an asso-
ciation. 
~~~ 
Title VII might arguably infringe upon these rights in 
two ways. First, there may be in some circumstances an absolute ----right to choose law partners free from government interference, 
even where one's preferences are partially influenced by racial 
attitudes. True, the Court in the past has suggested that the 
right of association does not confer any privilege to engage in 
discriminatory conduct free of government interference. But the 
Court has faced the question only in the context of laws outlaw-
ing racial discrimination by entities which purported served the 
I 
public generally. For example, Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 
u.s. 88, 94 (1945), upheld a ban on discrimination by labor 
unions-- "an organization ••• which holds itself out to repre-
sent the general business needs of employees." In upholding 
Title II's prohibition of discrimination in public accommoda-
tions, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 u.s. 
241-L 260 (1964), found that the persons to whom the Act applied 
had been obligated under the common law "to furnish proper accom-
modation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply 
../ 
for them."_ Runyon v. McCrary, 427 u.s. 160 (1975), held that the 
right of association did not protect the right to attend a ra-
cially discriminatory private school where that school invited 
attendance from the public generally. 
In contrast, "in certain personal contractual relation-
ships ••• such as those where the offeror selects those with whom 
he desires to bargain on an individualized basis, or where the 
contract is the foundation of a close association . . . , there is 
reason to assume that, although the choice made by the offeror is 
selective, it reflects 'a purpose of exclusiveness' other than 
the desire to bar members of the Negro race. Such a purpose, 
certainly in most cases, would invoke associational rights long 
respected." Id., at 187-188 (JUSTICE POWELL, concurring). In 
such cases, the right of association would seem to forbid any 
government attempt to regulate the preferences which underly per-
sonal choice. Griswold, and the cases protecting freedom of as-
sociation under the first amendment, imply that some associa-
tions, such as those involved in family life or education, are so 
I 
fundamental to the individual that the government may not tamper 
with these associations in ways to which the individual would 
hold objection. 
It may be argued from these cases that a partnership, 
particularly a law partnership, may be a "close association" to - --
which constitutional protection would attach. An enterprise in 
partnership, at least when the number of partners is small, will 
bring the partners into close collaboration with each other. And 
in the case of law partnership, the association is a collective 
enterprise to vindicate legal rights, which is protected by the 
first amendment. 
However, the associations that the Court has so far con-
sidered have been either been the family, or some association 
directly or indirectly involved with the advocacy of particular 
views. NAACP v. Button and its progeny might be viewed as cases 
securing a collective right to disseminate information or ideas 
concerning means of obtaining legal representation. An associa-
tion to practice law would then deserve special protection only 
insofar as it advocated some distinctive viewpoint. In contrast, 
the government exercises broad power to regulate commercial, in-
eluding professional, conduct by associations. E.g. North Dakota 
State Bd. v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 u.s. 156 (1973) 
(sustaining requirement that corporation operating pharmacy be 
owned and operated by registered pharmacists). The commercial 
practice of law is not a special first amendment enclave free of 
government regulation. Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 
u.s. 447, 459 (1978) ("A lawyer's procurement of remunerative 
I 
employment is a subject only marginally affected with First 
Amendment concerns.") Although the choice of partners may merit 
some first amendment protection, Congress' policy of assuring 
employment based on merit would then advance interests of suffi-
cient importance to constitute a reasonable exercise of regula-
tory power. 
While I believe that title VII as applied to any law 
partnership would probably be constitutional, I am inclined to 
think that this may raise a constitutional question of sufficient 
difficulty that the Court should avoid it by applying the "clear 
statement doctrine." Although the Court's precedents do not sup-
ply any strong precedent for a holding of unconstitutionality, 
they do suggest principles that suggest caution in extending 
title VII this far absent a more express indication of congres-
sional intent. Cf. Kent v. Dulles, 357 u.s. 116, 129 (1958) 
(narrow construction of statute to avoid constitutional 
question); Chiarella v. United States, 445 u.s. 222, 233 (1980) 
(requiring "explicit evidence of legislative intent" to expand 
upon duties of securities traders). The practice of law among a 
group of partners, particularly a small group, brings the part-
ners into close association. And because the practice of law 
places upon the lawyer a responsibility for civic affairs, a law 
firm often will be in a broad sense a political association even 
when it does not undertake to represent merely a single political 
viewpoint or message (as some firms in fact tend to do). 
Even if there is no general ri9ht to make partnership 
choices free from extensive government scrutiny, application of 
title VII may be of questionable constitutionality because it has 
a chilling effect on free choice. NAACP v. Alabama recognized 
---------------~------------that coerced disclosure of information about an association might 
violate associational rights by impeding the association's abili-
ty to recruit members. Disclosure is equally coerced if a firm 
may defend a title VII suit only by revealing confidences con-
cerning the governance of the firm and the affairs of individual 
clients. The record shows that petr in this case sought to dis-
cover information about how petr handled the cases on which she 
worked. 
The courts may protect this right adequately through the 
evidentiary rules and burdens of proof applied in title VII 
suits. For example, in the "discriminatory treatment" suit, the 
defendant has the burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory rea-
son for its decision not to hire the plaintiff: it should be 
recognized that an articulated reason sufficiently general to 
avoid breaching confidences or revealing the internal affairs of 
the firm should satisfy this burden. Protective orders are 
available to prevent intrusive discovery. In the "discriminatory 
impact" suit, the law firm should be able to meet its burden of 
showing the "business necessity" of statistically discriminatory 
practices, sufficient "business necessity" for discretionary and 
subjective hiring standards should lie in the need for selecting 
new partners in accordance with the prudent judgment of the part-
nership. The rights of association may require substantial def-, 
erence by the courts to the partnership's judgments. 
III. Conclusion 
It seems fairly clear that title VII by its terms does 
not apply generally to decisions to invite an individual to join 
a partnership. It is a close question, however, whether title 
VII applies to some partnership decisions because it can be shown 
that the opportunity to be considered for partnership was a 
"term, condition, or privilege" of employment. The statutory 
language might be construed not to apply to the opportunity to 
become a partner where the main purpose of the employment is to 
enable the firm to consider the associate's qualifications for 
partnership and to train the associate to assume the responsibil-
ities of partnership. The Court might prefer this narrower con-
struction of the statute to avoid the difficult constitutional 
question whether rights of association protect from government 
scrutiny a lawyer's decision to practice law in partnership with 
another lawyer. 
I consider the case close for two reasons. First, the 
statutory language -- "term, condition, or privilege" -- is quite 
sweeping, and the narrower construction that I have proposed 
finds no specific support in the structure of the statute or the 
legislative history and so might appear strained. Second, the 
Court's precedents establishing the right of association ad-
dressed situations quite different from that in question here. 
The constitutional question is difficult not because there are 
conflicting precedents but because there are no cases at all that 
provide satisfactory guidance to the Co~rt in balancing rights of 
association against the goals of equal employment opportunity 
enacted in title VII. 
lfp/ss 10/27/83 KING SALLY-POW 
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MEMO TO FILE: 
Points that may be relevant include: 
1. ,j Subjective judgments necessarily are made. 
Examples: 
a. Tenure decisions by a faculty. 
b. Selecting law clerks. 
c.~ Selecting from a group of summer clerks ones 
invited to become associates of the firm. 
d. ~ Where a firm, for example, needs an 
experienced tax partner and several good tax lawyers 
apply. 
,e. / would Title VII apply to divisions of firm 
profits? ( ~~t''~~?) 
f. Under the K&S partnership agreement, a 
partner is required to leave upon a vote by two thirds in 
interest of the partners, and "no cause need exist or be 
shown" (A, p. 154). Is this invalid? 
... 
What if petitioner were admitted to partnership, 
and later were asked to leave? 
2. The qualities that bring success to a lawyer 
include a broad spectrum. Most involve subjective 
judgments. At the initial employment stage, there is the 
college and law school record. Rarely is this considered 
the sole criteria. If so, interviews would be 
unnecessary. 
Law firms therefore tend to offer associate 
positions to students who have been summer clerks. The 
observation during that brief period involves more than 
the quality of legal work. Judgments are made as to 
personality and congeniality, client acceptability, 
prospects for become an influential citizen in the 
community. 
3. The legal profession differs from other 
professions. Law is not an exact discipline like -
/accounting or ~engineering. The most successful lawyers 
have a variety of skills in addition to sheer intellectual 
ability. 
The range of what a lawyer may be called on to 
do is as broad as the democratic and free enterprise 
system of our country. The need for legal services has no 
identifiable boundaries. A lawyer should have a capacity 
to speak and write well, ability to inspire confidence, to 
influence the thinking and judgments of other people, and 
to adapt quickly to an infinite number of unpredictable 
situations. 
Judgments as to which among several associates 
possess best these qualities necessarily are largely 
subjective. Indeed, they will vary among the partners 
with whom the associate has worked. In the end, the 
selection is a decision that should not be subject to 
review by a court or jury or least of all by a 
prosecutorial agency like the EEOC. 
4. Firms do not admit to partnership only 
lawyers who have served as associates. Increasingly, 
firms seek out new partners from other firms, from 
~ - ~-------------------------------------
government positions, to fill a need in a particular 
department. There is no formalized apprentice system 
under which one must first serve as an associate. 
5. Discrimination is unlikely to occur 
certainly at this late date - because it is contrary to a 
firm's best interest. A law firm's partnership decision 
can be analogi zed rough to that of a pro football team 
making 'draft selections: repeatedly, head coaches wi 11 
say that ideally they will draft to fill a particular need 
(e.g., a corner back) or if a quality corner back is not 
available, coaches draft the "best athlete" available. 
Making judgments between athletes is easier than between 
lawyers because of measurable physical attributes. But 
also there are intangibles - spirit, leadership, mental 
acuity and a will to win. The future of a law firm, like 
that of a football team, depends on the wisdom and care 
with which partners are chosen. Neither sex nor race is a 
negative factor in a modern law firm. 
6. Title VII was enacted not merely to prevent 
indefensible discrimination. It furthered national policy 
and the American goal of providing equal opportunity in 
initial employment and promotions. Public policy extends 
in the most limited sense, if at all, to the employment of 
lawyers as associates in firms. There certainly is no 
public policy implicated with respect to promotion 
decisions with in a law firm. Indeed, they are subject -
certainly in most firms - to approval of the partners who 
judge all of the factors mentioned above. 
7. There is plausibility to petitioner's 
argument that since an associate is an "employee", the 
partnership cannot discrimination against an associate 
with respect to a "term, condition, or privilege" of ~ 
employment. The argument goes on to say that one of the 
"terms" of the employment is a right to nondiscriminatory 
treatment when the partnership decision is made. This is 
tantamount to a promotion. 
This argument subjects partnership decisions to 
Title VII "through the backdoor". If one agrees, that the 
partnership itself is not "an entity" analogous to a 
corporation subject to Title VII, it makes little sense 
nevertheless to say that by conferring associate status 
the firm thereupon becomes subject to the statute. Even 
then, unless one treats a parternership as a corporation a 
law firm could invite an individual to become a partner 
who had never had any prior association with the firm - as 
often happens. And what about subsequent promotions 
within the firm {incidentially they are not called 
"promotions" and are evidenced by increases in a partner's 
participation in profits. And what about decreases where 
a partner ceases to be as productive as formerly? 
lfp/ss 10/27/83 DAVID SALLY-POW 
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Note to David: 
In thinking about the subjective factors that -
as I know from my law partnership years - I have taken a 
look at what I wrote in Bakke, 438 u.s. 267, at 317, 318. 
It may have some relevance. 
My view in Bakke, that became the law so far as 
university admissions are concerned, was that a college or 
university could consider race among a number of qualities 
in making admission decisions: 
"Such qualities could include exceptional 
personal talents, unique work ·or service 
experience, leadership potential, maturity, 
demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming 
disadvantage, ability to communicate with the 
poor, or other qualifications deemed important." 
Id., at 317 
On the next page, p. 318, I refer to these 
qualification and spoke of "similar nonobjective factors". 
Of course, Bakke was a Title VI and Equal 
Protection Clause case rather than Title VII though this 
in itself may not make a difference. Moreover, Bakke was 
written in light of the academic freedom that both 
tradition and the First Amendment support. In this case, 
2 0 
there is the somewhat related "right to associate" under 
the First Amendment that at least arguably partnership 
formations should have. Law firms do not seek "diversity" 
for its own sake. They certainly do consider specifically 
subjective qualities that are so essential to lawyers in 
general, and that may be particularly important depending 
on which department in a law firm there is need for an 
additional partner. An entirely different type 
personality may be needed for the labor department from 
that deemed desirable in the tax department. Similarly, 
most litigation partners had rather be "caught dead" than 
working in a real estate department - and perhaps vice 
versa. 
David, what do you think? 
L.F.P., Jr. 
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From: The Chief Justice 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES J )1 
No.82-940 ~ 
ELIZABETH ANDERSON HISHON, PETITIONER v. C ~ " 
KING & SPALDING - I ~ ..,..,.~ 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF ~~~. .. _., / 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1984] <:J, 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the ~ • 
Co:. granted certiorari to detennine whether the District y -;- /) 
Court properly dismissed a Title VII complaint alleging that (/\../ "f1 v 
a law partnership employed petitioner as an associate with 
the express representation that she would receive nondis-
criminatory consideration for partnership and that this prom-
ise was breached when the partnership discriminated against 
her in refusing to make her a partner. 
I 
A 
In 1972 petitioner Elizabeth Anderson Hishon accepted a 
position as an associate with respondent, a large Atlanta law 
firm established as a general partnership. When this suit 
was filed in 1980, the firm had more than 50 partners and em-
ployed approximately 50 additional attorneys as associates. 
Up to that time, no woman had ever been a partner at the 
firm. hl-~~rbn< · ~-
In May 1978 the partnership consipered and rejected ~~A:; 
Hishon for admission to the partnershiW one year later, the ~ 
partners again declined to invite Hishon to become a part- - , 
" 
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ner. 1 Once an associate is not selected for partnership, the 
associate is notified to begin seeking employment elsewhere. 
Petitioner's employment as an associate was terminated ef-
fective December 31, 1979. 
Hishon filed a charge with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission on November 19, 1979, claiming that re-
spondent had discriminated against her on the basis of her 
sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S. C. §§2000e et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V). Ten days later 
the Commission issued a notice of right to sue, and on Febru-
ary 27, 1980, Hishon brought this action in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. She 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, back pay, and com-
pensatory damages "in lieu of reinstatement and promotion 
to partnership." Joint Appendix (J. A.) 15. 
Petitioner's complaint alleges that, before she accepted 
employment as an associate, respondent represented to her 
that it hired new associates "with the expectation that the as-
sociate lawyer will be promoted and become a partner in the 
. . . firm on a fair and equal basis and within a reasonable pe-
riod of time." Id., at 8--9. Respondent allegedly repre-
sented further that "[a]ssociates who receive satisfactory 
evaluations from the firm will be promoted and made part-
ners in the firm as a matter of course after [a] five or six year 
period of apprenticeship," and that she accepted employment 
in "reliance upon the[se] representations and assurances." 
Id., at 9. 
B 
The District Court viewed respondent's partnership as a 
consensual relationship protected by the constitutional free-
1 The parties dispute whether the partnership actually reconsidered the 
1978 decision at the 1979 meeting. King & Spalding claims it voted not to 
reconsider the question and that Hishon therefore was required to file her 
claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 
days of the May 1978 meeting, not the meeting one year later, see 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e). The District Court's disposition of the case made it 
unnecessary to decide that question, and we do not reach it either. 
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dom of association and dismissed the complaint on the ground 
that Title VII was inapplicable to the selection of partners by 
a partnership. 2 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303 
(N. D. Ga. 1980). A divided panel of the United States 
Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that Title VII did not 
apply to the selection of partners. 678 F. 2d 1022 (CAll 
1982). We granted certiorari to review the dismissal of the 
complaint,-- U.S.--, and we reverse and remand for 
further proceedings. 
II 
Our resolution of this case turns on the all g ions of the 
complaint, which at this stage we must a cept as true. A 
court may dismiss a complaint on y 1 1s e am at no re-
lief could be granted usd:et-:-any--set:-of--faets that could be 
proved in support of the allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 
U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Here we have an explicit allegation 
that the respondent made a contract to consider petitioner 
for partnership on a "fair and equal" basis. If she can prove 
at trial that such a contract was made, and that the agree-
ment was violated for the reasons she alleges, petitioner will 
be entitled to relief under Title VII. 
A 
The relevant portion of Title VII provides as follows: 
"(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer-
2 The District Court dismissed under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1) on 
the ground that it lacked suO}ect-matter jurisdiction over petitioner's 
claim. Before it did so, limited discovery took place concerning the man-
ner in which respondent was organiZed. The court illd not find any ''juris-
dictwnaf facTs" in dispute , however. See Thomson v. Gaskill , 315 U. S. 
442, 446 (1942). Its reasoning makes clear that it dismissed petitioner's \ 
complaint on the assumption that all of her allegations could be proved. 
Because we find that the complaint did in fact state a claim cognizable 
under Title VII, we do not consider the wisdom of the District Court's in-
vocation of Rule 12(b)(1), as opposed to Rule 12(b)(6). 
4 
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(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or ap-
plicants for employment in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a). 
It is useful at this point to distinguish between two theories 
petitioner offers to bring her complaint within the scope of 
this language. Her first theory rests on the assertion that 
respondent partners are m reality "employees" of the part-
nership. She recognizes that this assertion conflicts with the 
common-law understanding of a partner's role in a partner-
ship but urges nonetheless that, in line with this Court's in-
terpretation of other federal statutes, the employment rela-
tionship for Title VII purposes should be defined by 
contemporary "economic realities," not common-law stand-
ards. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111 
(1944); accord Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 
366 U. S. 28 (1961); United States v. Silk , 331 U. S. 704 
(1947). Petitioner alleges that the arrangements in respond-
ent's formal partnership agreement 3 are sufficiently differ-
3 Some of the ways in which King & Spalding's partnership agreement 
deviates from the rules that would apply in the absence of such an agree-
ment are as follows. (1) The partnership is not dissolved by the addition, 
withdrawal, or death of a partner, but only by a two-thirds vote of "partici-
pating units." J. A. 154-55 (~ 5). Contra Ga. Code § 14-8-90 (1982); 
Harwell v. Cowan, 175 Ga. 33, 165 S. E. 19 (1932). (2) The firm is gov- 1 
erned not by majority vote of the partners but by the decisions of a three-
partner management committee, which are subject to override by a two-
thirds vote of the partners. J. A. 162-63 (~ 14). Contra Ga. Code 
§ 14-8-42. (3) Unless the partnership actually dissolves, a partner sepa-
rating from the firm is entitled only to a refund of his cash capital contribu-
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ent from those established at common law that respondent is 
different in name only from a corporation and that its part-
ners are in reality the same as corporate employees. If she 
is correct that partners in this context are "employees" for 
Title VII purposes, a refusal to extend a partnership invita-
tion may be viewed as a refusal to "hire" subject to Title 
VII's nondiscrimination commands. See 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). 
Because we find that petitioner's second theory of liability 
supports her allegations, as explained below, we need not 
fully resolve whether respondent's partners may be viewed 
as employees for Title VII purposes. We do, however, 
question the extent to which respondent's organization dif-
fers from a traditional partnership. A partnership is a con-
sensual or contractual relationship in which two or more indi-
viduals associate themselves by choice in a common endeavor 
for their common benefit. The essential features of this rela-
tionship, which petitioner implicitly concedes distinguish a 
typical partner from a mere employee, are all apparently 
present in respondent's organization. Respondent's part-
ners bear ultimate responsibility for managing firm affairs; 4 
they may each contractually bind the firm in business mat-
ters, Ga. Code § 1~1; they are individually liable for the 
partnership's debts, id., §§ 14--&-22, -46, and they share in 
the benefits of the partnership's profits and the burden of its 
expenses and losses, id., § 14--&-45; they are bound to act 
among themselves in "the strictest good faith," id., § 14--&-40; 
tion and his share of undistributed net earnings, rather than a pro rata 
share of the fair market value of the firm's net assets in excess of liabilities. 
J . A. 158-59 (1[ 9(a)). Contra Ga. Code § 14-8-45; Bryan v. Maddox, 249 
Ga. 762, 295 S. 'E. 2d 60 (1982). 
• The fact that the partnership does not operate by majority vote, but 
requires instead a two-thirds vote of the partnership to override the deci-
sions of a duly-authorized management committee, see n. 3, supra, is con-
sistent with the view that the partners are ultimately responsible for firm 
management. 
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and they are the ultimate owners of the partnership assets. 5 
Thus, if anything, the "economic realities" of respondent's 
organization suggest that its partners are no more "employ-
ees" than are partners in a typical partnership. Nor are we 
persuaded by petitioner's observation that an employee may 
possess any one of the characteristics of a partner without 
automatically losing "employee" status. 6 It is the conflu-
ence of these characteristics, not any one in particular, that 
makes a partner different in kind from an employee. At this 
stage, therefore, we are reluctant to accept the contention 
that respondent's partners should be considered "employees" 
for purposes of Title VII. 
B 
Petitioner's second theory of liability, which also is ad-
vanced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
as amicus, is decidedly more plausible. The partnership it-
self, the argument goes, is clearly an "employer" for Title 
VII purposes. 7 By the same token, regardless of a partner's 
5 This fact is not altered simply because respondent's partners may cash 
in their full ownership interests only if the firm eventually dissolves, see n. 
3, supra. 
• For instance, she points to our finding that under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act there "is nothing inherently inconsistent between the coex-
istence of a proprietary and an employment relationship." Goldberg v. 
Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc ., 366 U. S. 28, 32 (1961). Similarly, the 
fact that a person had management responsibilities would not alone be suf-
ficient to negate his status as an employee under Title VII. No authority, 
however, is cited for the view that a person with all the entitlements and 
obligations of a partner is an employee for Title VII purposes, and there is 
analogous authority to the contrary. The Seventh Circuit has held that 
partners are not to be included when a court calulates the number of em-
ployees in a business for purposes of 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b). Burke v. 
Friedman, 556 F. 2d 867 (1977). 
7 Under Title VII, an "employer" is a "person engaged in an industry af-
fecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day 
in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calen-
dar year ... . " 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b). A "person" is defined to include 
a partnership. § 2000e(a). 
, 
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status, an associate's relation to the partnership is clearly 
one of "employment." Title VII explicitly forbids an "em-
ployer" from discriminating with respect to an individual's 
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" and from 
depriving an individual of "employment opportunities" on the 
basis of sex. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a). According to peti-
tioner's allegations, one of the most important benefits of a 
person's employment as an associate at King & Spalding was 
the ultimate prospect of being invited to become a partner. 
Therefore, petitioner contends, consideration for partnership 
is one of the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" 
as an associate, and also an "employment opportunity." If 
that is true, of course, Title VII would require that respond-
ent consider each of its associates for partnership without re-
gard to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 8 
By force of the statutory language alone, this second the-
ory of liability has an obvious appeal. Even though a part-
ner is not an employee, a particular partnership could still 
make consideration for partnership an opportunity or privi-
lege of a person's employment as an associate. The Court of 
Appeals, however, concluded that such a construction of Title 
VII suffered a fatal flaw not found in the bare statutory lan-
guage. In the view of the Court of Appeals, Congress would 
8 As a third theory of liability, petitioner notes that respondent's refusal 
to make her a partner also effectively terminated her employment as an 
associate, under the firm's "up or out" policy. Thus, she contends, if the 
partnership decision was based on sex, so in effect was the termination de-
cision. We rejected a similar theory, however, in Delaware State College 
v. Ricks, 449 U. S. 250 (1980). There, the plaintiff was denied tenure and 
was extended instead a one-year nonrenewable employment contract. We 
held that the termination of employment at the expiration of the contract 
was not an unlawful employment practice independent of the allegedly un-
lawful refusal to award tenure; it was merely a "delayed, but inevitable, 
consequence of the denial of tenure." Id. , at 257-258. Analogously, be-
cause petitioner does not allege that the "up or out" policy was adminis-
tered with regard to sex, she is obliged to devise a theory showing that the 
partnership decision itself fell within the protection of Title VII. 
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never have approved an application of Title VII that "en-
croach[ed] upon individuals' decisions to voluntarily associate 
in a business partnership." 678 F. 2d, at 1028. The District 
Court was more explicit in elaborating the interests it 
thought would be threatened by application of Title VII to 
partnership decisions. In its view, a statute that purported 
to decide what persons a partnership must by law invite to 
share in the ownership and management of a business would 
raise serious constitutional problems by threatening the part-
nership's First Amendment freedom of association. The 
District Court considered, for example, Justice Goldberg's 
comments in his concurring opinion in Bell v. Maryland, 378 
u. s. 226 (1964): 
"Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but 
it is the constitutional right of every person to close his 
home or club to any person or to choose his social inti-
mates and business partners solely on the basis of per-
sonal prejudices . . . . These and other rights pertain-
ing to privacy and private association are themselves 
constitutionally protected liberties." Id., at 313 (em-
phasis added). 
In short, the District Court and the Court of Appeals rec- · 
ognized that Congress did not intend Title VII to interfere 
with a partnership's right freely to choose its members. 
However, petitioner alleges that the partnership agreed by 
contract to consider petitioner for partnership on a "fair and 
equal" basis. That is, she alleges that it contractually bound 
itself not to discriminate against her on the basis of her sex 
when it decided whether to make her a partner. If the evi-
dence shows that respondent indeed made such a contract, 
the partnership expressly disavowed the authority it asserts 
it had in choosing new members on the basis of any criteria it 
wished. The question is not whether Congress intended 
Title VII to intrude as a general matter into what are clearly 
partnership decisions but whether Title VII provides a fed-
eral court remedy when a partnership has made the kind of 
... 
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contract that petitioner alleges. Petitioner is entitled to her 
day in court to prove that the alleged contract was made and 
that it was breached. If she makes such proof, the partner-
ship cannot be heard to complain that its associational rights 
have been infringed; its associational options would have 
been altered by its own contract. 
III 
We conclude that petitioner's complaint states a claim cog-
nizable under Title VII. The case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
CHAMI!IERS 01'" 
.JUSTICE w ... .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
Dear Chief: 
.iu;tr~W Qiatttt af tfrt ~b ~tatt.a' 
..-as~~. Qt. 20p~~ 
No. 82-940 
Hishon v. King & Spalding 
December 28, 1983 
While I agree with your result in this case, I am troubled 
by several features of your opinion. As you point out, 
"petitioner's second theory of liability supports her 
allegations." Op. at 5. Accordingly, I do not see the need for 
the extensive dictum on pages 5 and 6 regarding her first theory. 
Your opinion also demonstrates that the discussion on page 8 of 
resporrlen t' s First Amendment theory is also unnecessary. In 
addition, I believe respondent's argument on this point is 
clearly wrong. See, e.g., Run¥'on v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 
(1976). See also Bob Jones Un1versity v. United States. 
Finally, I am dubious of the opinion's "contract" approach to 
Title VII. I doubt that it accurately characterizes 
"petitioner's second theory of liability" or that it reflects a 
fair interpretation of the statute's protections. 
For these reasons, I am afraid I cannot join your opinion 
and will therefore probably write separately. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
To: The Chief Justice 
Justice White 
Justice Marshall t4J 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-940 
ELIZABETH ANDERSON HISHON, PETITIONER v. 
KING & SPALDING 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[January -, 1984] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judginent. 
In my view, this case can and should be resolved on a dif-
ferent ground than that relied upon by the Court. With all 
respect, therefore, I cannot join the Court's opinion and con-
cur only in the judginent. 
I 
As the Court notes, the relevant portions of Title VII, 42 
U. S. C. §2000e-(a), provide: 
"(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer-
(!) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, 
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin .... " 
Petitioner's narrowest submission, 1 and that advanced by 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as 
' Petitioner offers three other theories to support her claim for relief 
under Title VII. First, she argues that, in light of King & Spalding's part-
nership agreement and the economic realities of modern law firm practice, 
res ondent's partners are "employees" within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2 e-2(a)( and t erefore respon ent s a1 ure to rna e petitioner a 
partner constitutes a discriminatory "refus[al] to hire" in violation of the 
statute. Second, petitioner claims that"Uildeffie firm's "up or out" pol-
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amicus, entails three simple propositions: (1) Respondent is 
an "employer" within the meaning of the statute; (2) as an as-
sociate of King & Spalding, petitioner's relationship with re-
spondent was one of "employment" within the meaning of the 
statute; and (3) the prospect for advancement to partnership 
held out to respondent's associates constitutes a "term[], con-
dition[], or privilege[] of employment" within the meaning of 
the statute. Therefore, respondent's alleged discrimination 
against petitioner when considering her for partnership was 
"an unlawful employment practice" wit nin § :.:..000e-2(a)(l). 
Petitioner's first and second propositions are practically 
self-evident; indeed, they are not seriously disputed by re-
spondent. First, Title VII defines an "employer" as a "per-
son engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fif-
teen or more employees for each working day in each of 
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding 
calendar year," 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b), and expressly in-
cludes "partnerships" within the definition of "person." 
§ 2000e(a). The complaint in this case alleges that respond-
ent is a partnership with more than 50 employees excluding 
its associates. J. A. 6. Second, the statute defines an "em-. ~-ployee" s1mply as a "person employed by an employer." 
~ 
amounted to a discriminatory "discharge" under§ 2000a-2(a)(l). Finally, 
petitioner and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, appearing 
as amicus, contend that discrimination in the selection of associates for 
partnership violates § 2000e-2(a)(2), which makes it "an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer- ... to limit, segregate, or classify his em-
ployees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or othe!'\\;se 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." This is so, petitioner claims, 
because the prospect of becoming a partner was an integral aspect of her 
"status as an employee" at King & Spalding as well as an "employment 
opportunity" associated with her job there. In light of the persuasiveness 
of petitioner's narrower claim under § 2000e-2(a)(2), infra, at--, there is 
no need to address these alternative theories. Nor do I understand the 
Court's remarks regarding the first, ante, at 5-6, and second, ante, at 7, n. 
8, of these theories to be necessary to its decision. 
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§ 2000e(f). There can be no serious doubt, and neither re-
spondent nor the two lower courts have attempted to raise 
one, that, as an associate, petitioner, who worked for a salary 
and had no ownership interest or management role in King & 
Spalding, was "a person employed by" respondent. 
Accordingly, the principal question to be decided is 
whether the prospect of being admitted to respondent's part-
nership was one of the "terms, conditions, or privileges" of 
petitioner's employment as an associate. Although the rele-
vant words are not defined by the statute, the breadth of the 
phrase adopted by Congress indicates that it is intended to 
bar a wide range of employment discrimination. See also 
infra, at --. As the memorandum submitted by the Sen-
ate managers of the bill that became Title VII explained, the 
statute comprehensively prohibits discrimination "in connec-
tion with employment." 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964). See 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U. S. 324, 352 (1977). See also 110 Cong. Rec. 12618 
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Muskie) (broad statutory phrase 
adopted as only practical alternative to "a complete itemiza-
tion of every practice which could conceivably be a viola-
tion"). Similarly, we have interpreted the analogous phrase 
in the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158(d), 
upon which Title VII was largely modeled, see Franks v. 
Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 768-770 (1976), 
as generally embracing "aspect[s] of the relationship between 
the employer and employees." 2 Allied Chemical & Alkali 
W01·kers, Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 
U. S. 157, 178 (1971). See also NLRB v. Borg-Warner 
z Title 29 U. S. C. § 158(d) defines collective bargaining, inter alia, as 
requiring employers and employees to meet and confer "with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. ... " The 
additional word "privileges" in Title VII suggests that its scope is, if any-
thing, broader than that of the analogous phrase in the National Labor Re-
lations Act. 
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Corp., 356 U. S. 342, 353 (1958) (opinion of Harlan, J.); Ford 
Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U. S. 448, 495-496 (1979)." 3 
As the Court notes, the district court's dismissal of the 
complaint cannot be sustained unless "it appears beyond 
8 At the conclusion of its opinion, the Court adopts a novel theory of 
Title VII under which petitioner must prove the existence of a common law 
contract in order to receive the protections of the federal statute. Ante, at 
8-9. The Court apparently holds that, because "Con~:··ess di 1 not intend 
Title VII to interfere with a partnership's right freely to choose its mem-
bers," ante, at 8, a plaintiff must establish that a law firm defendant con-
tractually waived its exemption from the statute. If this is what the Court 
means, I respectfully suggest that its analysis is flawed. There is no evi-
dence in either the language or the legislative history of the statute that 
Congress intended to exempt from the plain meaning of Title VII a law 
firm's decisions respecting the terms and conditions of an associate's em-
ployment, see infra, at --, and the suggestion that a eontrary intent 
would violate the First Amendment is without merit, see infra, at --. 
Moreover, if in fact "Congress did not intend Title VII to interfere '\\-ith a 
partnership's right freely to choose its members," I cannot understand how 
"Title VII [could nevertheless] provide[) a federal court remedy when a 
partnership has made the kind of contract that petitioner alleges." Ante, 
at 8-9. The drafters of the statute would surely be surprised to learn that 
it amounts to a deYice by which parties can consent to bring their contract 
disputes \\ithin the jurisdiction of the federal courts. And if the Court's 
holding is as I have described it, it leaves completely unresolved the ulti-
mate question presented by this case: Once petitioner has established re-
spondent's contractual "consent" to the jurisdiction of a federal court, what 
must she then show to prove that respondent discriminated against her 
with respect to the "terms, conditions, or privileges of [her] employment"? 
The Court's repeated references to contract law may constitute its im-
plicit answer to that question. Specifically, the Court may be suggesting 
that in order to state a claim for relief under Title VII a plaintiff must al-
lege that the defendant "made a contract to consider petitioner for partner-
ship on a 'fair and equal' basis." Ante, at 3. Such a standard of proof 
would, in my view, constitute an inappropriate reading of the federal stat-
ute. Express or implied employment contracts unquestionably provide an 
important source for identifying, in a given case, the particular nature of 
"compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" within the 
meaning of§ 2000e-2(a)(l). It is, however, difficult to see the point of the 
elaborate scheme adopted by Congress if it does no more than afford a fed-
eral forum for efforts to enforce common law contracts to provide "fair and 
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doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 
[her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief." McLain v. 
Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U. S. 232, 246 
(1980), quoting, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 
Based on respondent's 0\\'11 undisputed affidavit~, petitioner 
provides a sufficient jurisdictional basis for her claim that, at 
King & Spalding, consideration of associates for partnership 
comes within the broad scope of the statute's language. As 
the EEOC puts it, "[t]o say that the prospect for advance-
ment to partnership is 'an aspect of the relationship' between 
the associate and a law firm is an understatement." Brief 
for the EEOC, at 9. The record provides a basis for peti-
tioner's claim that at King & Spalding, as at most large firms , 
the prospect of becoming a partner is central to a young at-
torney's decision to accept employment with the firm; to the 
firm's ability to attract and train highly-qualified lawyers; 
and to the associate's tenure for several years as an appren-
tice for partnership. For instance, in answering petitioner's 
complaint, respondent acknowledged that "all associates are 
equal" treatment. In fact, the language and history of the statute, as well 
as our interpretations of it and analogous laws, plainly demonstrate that 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) is meant broadly to prohibit discrimination in "aspect[s] of 
the relationship between employer and employees," supra, at--, and 
not somehow to federalize the law of contracts. Nor, consistent with Con-
gressional intent, can state contract law hinder achievement of the stat-
ute's aims. For instance, sex discrimination in the opportunity to partici-
pate in a deferred compensation plan could not escape the prohibitions of 
Title VII simply because it was "express" or "contractual." Cf., Arizona 
GoPenzing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensa-
tion Plans\'. ]\'orris , - U. S. -- (1983); Los Angeles Dept. of Water & 
Pou·er v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702 (1978). See also Peters v. Missouri-
Pacific Railroad Co., 483 F. 2d 490, 492, n. 3 (CA 5 1973). See generally, 
B. Schlei and P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 23-25 (1976). 
In short, while proof of a contractual undertaking by respondent not to dis-
criminate against women rna~· strengthen petitioner's Title VII claim, re-
spondent's obligation to treat its employees equally does not derive solely 
from its voluntary promise to do so. It is, instead, a mandate of federal 
law. 
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employed with the expectation that they will be considered 
for invitation to the partnership on a fair and equal basis 
within a reasonable period of time if they meet the firm's 
standards for partnership." J. A. 30-31.4 Similarly, one of 
respondent's partners testified that "most of the lawyers con-
sidered for partnership are considered after having joined the 
firm following law school or judicial clerkships and after 
working at the firm as an associate for a number of years," 
J. A. 45. The same partner also explained that associates at 
the firm receive regular evaluations intended partly to assess 
their suitability for partnership, J. A. 45-46. Finally, re-
spondent's policy of asking associates who do not become 
partner to leave the firm, see J. A. 31-32, coupled with the 
fact that the firm's associates form the principal pool from 
which partners are dravm, shows that the firm is chiefly in-
terested in lawyers as potential partners. In sum, again 
quoting the EEOC, "the opportunity to become a partner, 
and the firm's consideration of the associate for partnership, 
shape the entire relationship between the firm and its em-
ployee." Brief for EEOC, at 9. That opportunity is there-
fore clearly one of the more significant of an associate's 
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. " 
II 
Respondent advances essentially three counterarguments 
to petitioner's position. I find none of them persuasive. 
A 
First, respondent asserts that "[e]lection to the partner-
ship is not a promotion. It is a change in status from em-
• The finn's settled practices in this and other respects need not rise to 
the level of a contractual arrangement in order to constitute evidence that 
consideration for partnership is a "term[], condition[] , or privilege[]" of an 
associate's employment at King & Spalding. Instead, petitioner need 
show only that similarly situated male associates were in fact customarily 
considered for partner and that she was denied consideration on an equal 
basis because of her sex. Title \'II would prohibit respondent from im-
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ployee to employer-owner-a change of kind, not degree." 
Brief for Respondent, at 64 (footnote omitted). Because a 
partner is not an "employee" within the meaning of the stat-
ute, respondent contends, the decision whether to elevate an 
associate to that status cannot be an employment decision 
under Title VII. 
Assuming that partners are not in fact employees, see n. 1 
supra, this reasoning does not affect the conclusion that con-
sideration of associates for partnership is a "term[], condi-
tion[], or privilege[]" of their employment. 5 For example, in 
Golden State Buitling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U. S. 168, 187-189 
(1973), which presented an analogous question under the 
labor laws, we held that an employee may not be denied pro-
motion to a position exempt from statutory protections on 
grounds that violate the statute. In that case, the Court 
unanimously adopted the reasoning of NLRB v. Bell Aircraft 
Corp., 206 F. 2d 235, 237 (CA2 1953): 
"At the time the discrimination took place he was clearly 
a protected employee, and his prospects for promotion 
were among the conditions of his employment. The Act 
protected him so long as he held a nonsupervisory posi-
tion, and it is immaterial that the protection thereby af-
forded was calculated to enable him to obtain a position 
in which he would no longer be protected." 
Similarly, it is immaterial that the employment opportunity 
petitioner was allegedly denied because of her sex was one 
which might have placed her outside of Title VII's protection. 
properly treating its male employees better than its female employees-
even if it had promised to engage in such discrimination. Seen. 3, supra. 
6 The fact that consideration for partnership may occur just before the 
end of an associate's employment renders that opportunity no Jess a term 
or condition of employment than the chance to participate in a pension plan, 
the benefits of which will obviously be realized after termination of employ-
ment. See, e. g., Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F. 2d 1040, 1042 
(CA4 1976); Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R.R., supra; Rosen v. Public Serv-
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B 
Respondent also contends that, notwithstanding the appar-
ent applicability of the language of Title VII, the statute was 
not intended to apply to consideration of associates for part-
nership. The Court of Appeals apparently adopted this ar-
gument, concluding that "[d]ecisions as to who will be part-
ners are not within the protection of Title VII." Pet. App. 
A13. Neither respondent nor the court below has, however, 
identified any provision of Title VII or any portion of its leg-
islative history to support this conclusion. 6 Instead 1 revers-
ing the presumption created by the plain language of the stat-
ute, respondent claims that Congress's silence reflects an 
implicit intention to exclude consideration of associates for 
partnership from the scope of the statute. 
Neither the purposes nor the history of Title VII indicates 
that Congress meant to insulate employment discrimination 
of the kind claimed here from the plain meaning of 
§ 2000e-2(a). The statute represents a comprehensive effort 
to ban "all practices in whatever form which create inequality 
in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis 
of race, religion, sex, or national origin." County of Wash-
ington v. Gunther, 452 U. S. 161, 178 (1981). See also Me-
ice Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F . 2d 90, 94-95 (CA31973); Bartmess v. Dreurrys 
U.S. A., Inc., 444 F . 2d 1186, 1188 (CA7 1971). 
6 The only piece of legislative history cited by respondent in support of 
its contention that Congress implicitly exempted law firm decisions con-
cerning partners from Title VII is a comment made by Senator Cotton 
prior to passage of the statute. Speaking in support of a bill that would 
have excluded from the statute employers with fewer than 100 employees, 
Senator Cotton observed that "when a small businessman .. . selects an 
employee, he comes very close to selecting a partner." 110 Cong. Rec. 
13,085 (1964). Respondent suggests that this comment demonstrates that 
"selecting a partner" was u\derstood to be outside of the statute's cover-
age. Balanced against the evidence that Congress did not intend to ex-
clude partnership decisions from the statute, see infra, at-, however, 
these remarks by a Senator who unsuccessfully sought to limit the scope of 
the statute ultimately passed have little weight. See NLRB v. Fruit 
Packers , 377 U. S. 58, 66 (1964). 
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Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 800 (1973); 
S. Rep. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 12 (1964). Consist-
ent with these broad aims, the House Report expressed the 
hope that Title VII would improve employment opportunities 
for "teachers, doctors, lawyers, scientists, and engineers." 
H. R. Rep. No. 914 (Pt. 2), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963) 
(separate views of Rep. McCulloch and others). And when 
Congress intended to exclude certain kinds of employers 
from the comprehensive reach of the statute, it said so ex-
pressly. See, e. g., 42 U. S.C. §2000e(b)(2) (bona fide pri-
vate membership clubs); § 2000e(b)(l) (the United States gov-
ernment); § 2000e-1 (religious corporations and associations); 
§ 2000e(b) (employers with fewer than a certain number, usu-
ally 15, employees). 7 Under these circumstances, respond-
ent's claim that Congress silently adopted a similar exemp-
tion for law firm partnership decisions is unavailing. 
c 
Finally, respondent suggests that Title VII cannot be read 
to apply to a law firm's partnership decisions without threat-
ening the partnership's First Amendment freedom of associa-
'Congress's decision to create specific exemptions for small businesses 
and for private clubs demonstrate that it took account of policy concerns 
\\ith privacy and associational interests when it enacted Title VII. See 
110 Cong. Rec. 13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (businesses that 
exceed statutory number of employees "lose most of whatever intimate, 
personal character they might have had"). See also Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103 (amending 
§ 2000e-1 to remove exemption for educational institutions); Lieberman v. 
Gant, 630 F. 2d 60 (CA2 1980) (applying amended § 2000e-1 to faculty ten-
ure decisions); 118 Cong. Rec. 3800-3801 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams 
and Sen. Javits) (opposing unsuccessful proposal to exempt from Title VII 
employment of hospital physicians on ground amendment would undermine 
"fundamental" purpose of statute to allow "minorities and women ... ac-
cess to high-level and professional job categories). Respondent's conten-
tions in this Court that the presence of these and similar interests in a law 
finn outweigh the statute's policy against discrimination, see, e. g., Brief 
for Respondent, at 10-28, 38--44, are therefore addressed to the \\Tong 
branch of government. 
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tion. • On several occasions, however, this Court has ex-
plained that while the Consititution may protect association 
for purposes of advocating discrimination, it does not shield 
from otherwise valid legislation the practice of discrimination 
itself. In Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 176 (1976), for 
example, we explained: 
From [the] principle [of associational freedom recog-
nized in cases like NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 
(1963)] it may be assumed that parents have a First 
Amendment right to send their children to educat;onal 
institutions that promote the belief that racial segrega-
tion is desirable, and that the children have an equal 
right to attend such institutions. But it does not follow 
that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such 
institutions is also protected by the same principle. As 
the Court stated in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455 
[(1973)], "the Constitution ... places no value on dis-
crimination," id., at 469, and while "[i]nvidious private 
discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercis-
ing freedom of association protected by the First 
Amendment ... it has never been accorded affirmative 
constitutional protections. And even some private dis-
crimination is subject to special remedial legislation in 
certain circumstances under § 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment; Congress has made such discrimination un-
lawful in other significant contexts." ld., at 470. (Em-
phasis original). 
See also Bob Jones University v. United States, -- U. S. 
--,-- (1983); id., at-- (opinion of POWELL, J.); id., at 
--, n. 3 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); Norwood v. Harri-
son, supra, at 470 and n. 10; Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 
8 The Court seems to signal its approval of respondent's First Amend-
ment argument, see ante, at 8, which also formed the basis of the district 
court's dismissal of petitioner's complaint, see Pet. App. at A18-A20. If 
the Court means to imply that this argument has merit, I respectfully dis-
agree for the reasons set out in the text. 
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326 U. S. 88, 93-94 (1945). Cf., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 
1, 6~6 (1976) (per curiam); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 
449, 460 (1958). 
In this case, petitioner asserts that respondent discrimi-
nated against her and respondent makes no colorable claim 
that its ability to advance its political views or otherwise en-
gage in protected activities will be hampered if Title VII acts 
to bar it from continuing such discrimination. The sugges-
tion that respondent's alleged "[i]nvidious private discrimina-
tion" deserves "affirmative constitutional protections," cf., 
Norwood v. Harrison, supra, at 470, is therefore v.ritho·1t 
merit. 
III 
Petitioner's complaint alleges that res'pondent, in denying 
her equal consideration for advancement to partnership be-
cause of her sex, discriminated against her v.rith respect to a 
term, condition, or privilege of her employment as an associ-
ate at King & Spalding. J. A. 7. In my view, this allegation 
states a claim upon which relief can be granted under the 
plain meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Accordingly, I 
join the Court's judgment reversing the dismissal of the case. 
CHAMBERS 01" 
T H ,~ CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u.pumt <IJourl .of tJ{t ~b .jtatts 
:Jiru fringhtn.. ~. <!f. 2ll,? '!-~ 
December 30, 1983 
Re: 82-940 - Hishon v. King & Spalding 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
There seems to be a considerable feeling that the case should 
not turn on the contract, as in my first circulation. 
In light of this, I will try my hand at another run. 
Happy New Year. 
CH ..... BI!:RS OF" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
,upr~nu CIJ&tltrl £tf tlf.t ~nit.tb $>i ttt• 
·-lfinghtn. ~. CIJ. 211.;t,.~ 
December 30, 1983 
Re: 82-940 - Hishon v. Spalding & King 
Dear Chief: 
If I understand your proposed draft op1n1on, there 
could be no recovery under Title VII apart from the 
alleged contractual theory. If this analysis is 
correct, I wonder if there is federal jurisdiction to 
award recovery on a breach of contract theory inasmuch 
as the parties are both citizens of the same State. 
I had thought the Conference had decided that 
Title VII did provide a remedy in a case in which it 
was alleged that male employees were eligible for 
partnership but female employees were not. If that 
theory is accepted, I think Bill Brennan is correct in 
suggesting that there is no need to express an opinion 
on the partnership theory discussed at pp. 2-6, or, it 
would seem to me, on the theory that you reject in 
footnote 8 on p. 7. 
As presently advised, I therefore expect to wait 
for further writing. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
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I believe that the Chief Justice's opinion generally 
reflects your views of this case. However, the last paragraph of 
part II, pp. 8-9, is difficult to interpret. As I understand it, 
the paragraph argues that Title VII provides a federal court rem-
edy when a partnership, which otherwise would be free to dis-
criminate, promises its employees "fair and equal" treatment. 
The paragraph does not clearly explain the basis for this argu-
ment. It suggests that the partnership may have waived by con-
tract an judicially implied Title VII exemption, but does not 
indicate how such a "waiver" can confer jurisdiction upon the 
federal court or a cause of action upon a plaintiff who would 
otherwise have none. Clearly, the federal court cannot exercise 
jurisdiction over a state contract action, and Title VII was not 
intended by Congress to be a jurisdictional provision. 
I can see at least two bases for the argument presented 
here. The premise of both approaches is that respondent, by con-
tractually promising its employees "fair and equal" treatment, 
has removed itself from the class of partnerships whose associa-
tional rights arguably would be violated by the application of 
Title VII. Two consequences might follow. First, even if it 
were the intent of Congress to· respect rights of association, as 
the Court should presume in interpreting the statute, Title VII 
could still be construed to apply in petitioner's case, because 
page 2. 
respondent is no longer in the class of protected associations 
with regard to its relationships with its employees. For the 
same reason, the Court might find as a prudential matter that 
respondent does not have standing to assert its freedom of asso-
ciation in this case as a matter of constitutional right. I am 
afraid, however, that the opinion is a long way from providing 
adequate grounding for either approach. 
January 2, 1984 
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Dear Chief: 
t am generally with you in this case. In view of 
questjons raised by other Justices, I make the following 
suggestion: 
Of course a federal court cannot exercise ;uris-
diction over a state contract action absent diversitv, and 
Title VII - in and of its~lf - does not confer such juris-
, diction. The followinq reasoning may support your desire to 
write narrowly. We must accept, on a motion to di.smiss, 
that King & Spalding contractually promised Hishon "fair and 
equal" treatment with respect to partnership, and thereby 
removed itself from the class of partnershios whose associa-
tional rights arguably would be violated if Title VII were 
applied to the partnership decision. We could assume that it 
was the intention of Congress to respect the traditional 
rights of association that have characterized law partner-
ships for centuries. Title VII stilJ could be construed to 
apply to Hishon's case because King & Spalding is no longer 
in the class of protected associations - at least with re-
spect to Hishon in view of the alleged express agreement 
made with her. 
Although not articulated exactly as I have, Hishon 
brought this suit under Title VII, the courts and counsel 
have viewed it as a 'T'itle VII case, and it seems to me that 
on the assumptions above stated this reasoning is sound. 
Whether you could get a Court may be another matter. 
Letters to you from three of our colleagues have 
suggested it is unnecessary to discuss the status of a part-
nership if we hold that associate lawyers mav be employees 
within the meaning of Title VII. But I would not agree - at 
least as presently advised - that ~ law firm invariably is 
an employer of associate lawyers. I think we should say 
2. 
this, much as you have. We took this case to determine the 
extent to which a law firm is subject to ~itle VII. For me, 
this question should be decided on a case-by-case basi~ de-
pending on what commitments were made at the time of emplov-
ment. 
We resolve little or nothing if we limit our opin-
ion as others have suggested. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief ~ustice 
J. fp/sC3 
~upf ·mt Of4tltrl d tlrt ~tt~ ~hdts 
';: Jag~~. Of. 2Dgt)J.~ 
I 
CHAMBERS Of" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
January 3, 1984 
Re: 82-940 - Hishon v. King & Spalding 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conf erence 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~n.prtntt <!Joud of tqt 1tnittb ~tatt.s­
'~lhu~Ittttgton, ~. <IJ . 2ll.;t'l~ 
January 3, 1984 
No. 82-940 Hishon v. King & Spalding 
Dear Chief, 
v 
I will wait for your revised opinion in 
this case. I still think the opinion should recognize 
a recovery under Title VII rather than on simply the 
contract theory. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS Of' 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~u:vumt Qfllurt 1tf tlrt ~th j;ta±t.s 
'Dla.s4ittghtn, ~. (!f. 2ll~Jt~ 
January 4, 1984 
Re: No. 82-940-Hishon v. King & Spalding 
Dear Bill: 
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From: The Chief Justice 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: MAY Q 2 1984 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-940 
ELIZABETH ANDERSON HISHON, PETITIONER 
v. KING & SPALDING 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1984] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to determine whether the District 
Court properly dismissed a Title VII complaint alleging that 
a law partnership discriminated against petitioner, a woman 
lawyer employed as an associate, when it failed to invite her 
to become a partner. 
I 
A 
In 1972 petitioner Elizabeth Anderson Hishon accepted a 
position as an associate with respondent, a large Atlanta law 
firm established as a general partnership. When this suit 
was filed in 1980, the firm had more than 50 partners and em-
ployed approximately 50 attorneys as associates. Up to that 
time, no woman had ever served as a partner at the firm. 
Petitioner alleges that the prospect of partnership was an 
important factor in her initial decision to accept employment 
with respondent. She alleges that respondent used the pos-
sibility of ultimate partnership as a recruiting device to in-
duce petitioner and other young lawyers to become associates 
at the firm. According to the complaint, respondent repre-
sented that advancement to partnership after five or six 
years was "a matter of course" for associates "who receive[ d) 
satisfactory evaluations" and that associates were promoted 
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to partnership "on a fair and equal basis." Petitioner alleges 
that she relied on these representations when she accepted 
employment with respondent. The complaint further al-
leges that respondent's promise to consider her on a "fair and 
equal basis" created a binding- employment contract. 
In May 1978 the partnership considered and rejected 
Hishon for admission to the partnership; one year later, the 
partners again declined to invite her to become a partner. 1 
Once an associate is passed over for partnership at respond-
ent's firm, the associate is notified to begin seeking employ-
ment elsewhere. Petitioner's employment as an associate 
terminated on December 31, 1979. 
B 
Hishon filed a charge with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission on November 19, 1979, claiming that re-
spondent had discriminated against her on the basis of her 
sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U. S. C. §§2000e et Sf3Q. Ten days later the Commission is-
sued a notice· of right to sue, and on February 27, 1980, 
Hishon brought this action in the United . States District 
Court for the Northern District of Georgia. She sought de-
claratory and injunctive relief, back pay, and compensatory 
damages "in lieu of reinstatement and promotion to partner-
ship." This, of course, negates any claim for specific per-
formance of the contract alleged. 
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground 
that Title VII was inapplicable to the selection of partners by 
1 The parties dispute whether the partnership actually reconsidered the 
1978 decision at the 1979 meeting. Respondent claims it voted not to re-
consider the question and that Hishon therefore was required to file her 
claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 
days of the May 1978 meeting, not the meeting one year later, see 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e). The District Court's disposition of the case made it 
unnecessary to decide that question, and we do not reach it. 
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a partnership. 2 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303 (ND 
Ga. 1980). A divided panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 678 F. 2d 1022 
(1982). We granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1983), and 
we reverse. -n 
At this stage of the litigation, we must accept petitioner's 
allegations as true. A court may dismiss a complaint only if 
it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of 
facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The issue be-
fore us is whether petitioner's allegations state a claim under 
Title VII, the relevant portion of which provides as follows: 
"(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer-
(!) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added). 
A 
Petitioner alleges that respondent is an "employer" to 
whom Title VII is addressed. 3 She then asserts that consid-
2 The District Court dismissed under Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1) on 
the ground that it Jacked subject-matter jurisdiction over petitioner's 
claim. Although limited discovery previously had taken place concerning 
the manner in which respondent was organized, the court did not find any 
"jurisdictional facts" in dispute. See Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U. S. 442, 
446 (1942). Its reasoning makes clear that it dismissed petitioner's com-
plaint on the ground that her allegations did not state a claim cognizable 
under Title VII. Our disposition makes it unnecessary to consider the 
wisdom of the District Court's invocation of Rule 12(b)(1), as opposed to 
Rule 12(b)(6). 
8 The statute defines an "employer" as a "person engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working 
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eration for partnership was one of the "terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment" as an associate with respondent. 4 
See § 2000e--2(a)(l). If this is correct, respondent could not 
base an adverse partnership decision on "race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin." 
Once a contractual relationship of employment is estab-
lished, the provisions of Title VII attach and govern certain 
aspects of that relationship. 5 The contract may be written 
or oral, formal or informal; an informal contract of employ-
ment may arise by the simple act of an mg a JO a plicant a 
sliove an prov1 mg a wor p ace. e contractual relation-
s 1p of emp oyment. triggers the provision of Title VII gov-
erning "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 
Title VII in turn forbids discrimination on the basis of "race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 
Because the underlying employment relationship is con-
tractual, it follows that the "terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment" clearly include benefits that are part of an 
employment contract. Here, petitioner in essence alleges 
that respondent made a contract to consider her for partner-
ship. 6 Indeed, this promise was allegedly a key contractual 
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding 
calendar year," § 2000e(b), and a "person" is explicitly defined to include 
"partnerships," § 2000e(a). The complaint alleges that respondent's part-
nership satisfies these requirements. Joint Appendix 6. 
' Petitioner has raised other theories of Title VII liability which, in light 
of our disposition, need not be addressed. 
5 Title VII also may be relevant in the absence of an existing employ-
ment relationship, as when an employer refuses to hire someone. See 
§ 2000e-2(a)(l). However, discrimination in that circumstance does not 
concern the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," which is the 
focus of the present case. 
6 Petitioner not only alleges that respondent promised to consider her for 
partnership, but also that it promised to consider her on a "fair and equal 
basis." This latter promise is not necessary to petitioner's Title VII claim. 
Even if the employment contract did not afford a basis for an implied condi-
tion that the ultimate decision would be fairly made on the merits, Title 
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provision which induced her to accept employment. If the 
evidence at trial establishes that the parties contracted to 
have petitioner considered for partnership, that promise 
clearly was a term, condition, or privilege of her employ-
ment. Title VII would then bind respondents to consider 
petitioner for partnership as the statute provides, i. e., with-
out regard to petitioner's sex. The contract she alleges 
would lead to the same result. 
Petitioner's claim that a contract was made, however, is 
not the only allegation that would qualify respondent's con-
sideration of petitioner for partnership as a term, condition, 
or privilege of employment. An employer may provide its 
employees with many benefits that it is under no obligation to 
furnish by any express or implied contract. Such a benefit, 
though not a contractual right of employment,~ qualify as 
a "privileg_e" of em~oyment under Title yn. A benefit t hat 
is part and parcel of tlie employment relationship may not be 
doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer 
would be free under the employment contract simply not to 
provide the benefit at all. Those benefits that comprise the 
"incidents of employment," S. Rep. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 11 (1964), 7 or that form "an aspect of the relationship 
between the employer and employees," Allied Chemical & 
Alkali Workers, Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 
404 U. S. 157, 178 (1971),8 may not be afforded in a manner 
ation for partnership is a term, condition, or privilege of employment, then 
the partnership decision must be without regard to "race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin." 
7 Senate Report 867 concerned S. 1937, which the Senate postponed in-
definitely after it amended a House version of what ultimately became the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 110 Cong. Rec. 14,602 (1964). The report is 
relevant here because S. 1937 contained language similar to that ultimately 
found in the Civil Rights Act. It guaranteed "equal employment opportu-
nity," which was defined to "include all the compensation, terms, condi-
tions, and privileges of employment. " S. Rep. 867, 88th Cong. , 2d Sess. 
24 (1964). 
8 Allied Chemical pertains to Section 8(d) of the NLRA, which describes 
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contrary to Title VII. 
Several allegations in petitioner's complaint would support 
the conclusion that the opportunity to become a partner was 
part and parcel of an associate's status as an employee at re-
spondent's firm, independent of any allegation that such an 
opportunity was included iri associates' employment con-
tracts. Petitioner alleges that respondent's associates could 
regularly expect to be considered for partnership at the end 
of their "apprenticeships," and it appears that lawyers out-
side the firm were not routinely so considered. 9 Thus, the 
benefit of partnership consideration was allegedly linked di-
rectly with an associate's status as an employee, and this 
linkage was far more than coincidental: petitioner alleges that 
respondent explicitly used the prospect of ultimate partner-
ship to induce young lawyers to join the firm. Indeed, the 
importance of the partnership decision to a lawyer's status as 
an associate is underscored by the allegation that associates' 
employment is terminated if they are not elected to become 
partners. These allegations, if proved at trial, would suffice 
to show that partnership consideration was a term, condition, 
or privilege of an associate's employment at respondent's 
firm, and accordingly that partnership consideration must be 
without regard to sex. 
B 
Respondent contends that advancement to partnership 
may never qualify as a term, condition or privilege of employ-
the obligation of employers and unions to meet and confer regarding 
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 29 
U. S. C. § 158(d). The meaning of this analogous language sheds light on 
the Title VII provision at issue here. We have drawn analogies to the 
NLRA in other Title VII contexts, see Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976), and have noted that certain sections of Title VII 
were expressly patterned after the NLRA, see Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 419 (1975). 
9 Respondent's own submissions indicate that most of respondent's part-
ners in fact were selected from the ranks of associates who had spent their 
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ment for purposes of Title VII. First, respondent asserts 
that elevation to partnership entails a change in status from • · · 
an "employee" to an "employer." However, even if respond-
ent is correct that a partnership invitation is not itself an of-
fer of employment, Title VII would nonetheless apply and 
preclude discrimination on the basis of sex. The benefit a 
plaintiff is denied need not be employment to fall within Title 
VII's protection; it need only be a term, condition, or privi-
lege of employment. It is also of no consequence that em-
ployment as an associate necessarily ends when an associate 
becomes a partner. A benefit need not accrue before a per-
son's employment is completed to be a term, condition, or 
privilege of that employment relationship. Pension benefits, · 
for example, qualify as terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment even though they are received only after employ-
ment terminates. Arizona Governing Committee for Tax 
Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation P la?J,s v. Nor-
ris,-- U.S.--,-- (1983). Accordingly, nothing in 
the change in status that advancement to partnership might 
entail means that partnership consideration falls outside the 
terms of the statute. See Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & 
Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (SDNY 1977). 
Second, respondent argues that Title VII categorically ex-
empts partnership decisions from scrutiny. However, re-
spondent points to nothing in the statute or the legislative 
history that would support such a per se exemption. 10 When 
entire prepartnership legal careers (excluding judicial clerkships) with the 
firm. See Joint Appendix 45-46. 
10 The only legislative history respondent offers to support its position is 
Senator Cotton's defense of an unsuccessful amendment to limit Title VII 
to businesses with 100 or more employees. In this connection the Senator 
stated: 
"[W]hen a small businessman who employs 30 or 25 or 26 persons selects an 
employee, he comes very close to selecting a partner; and when a business-
man selects a partner, he comes dangerously close to the situation he faces 
when he selects a wife." 110 Cong. Rec. 13,085 (1964); accord 118 Cong. 
Rec. 1524, 2391 (1972). 
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Congress wanted to grant an employer complete immunity, it 
expressly did so. 11 
Third, respondent argues that application of Title VII in 
this case would infringe constitutional rights f expression or 
association. Althoug we have recognized tha e activities 
of lawyers may make a "distinctive contribution . . . to the 
ideas and beliefs of our society," NAACP v. Button, 371 
U. S. 415, 431 (1963), respondent has not shown how its abil-
ity to fulfill such a function would be inhibited by a require-
ment that it consider petitioner for partnership on her mer-
its. Moreover, as we have held in another context, 
"[i]nvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a 
form of exercising freedom of association protected by the 
First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative 
constitutional protections." Norwood v. Harrison, 413 
U. S. 455, 470 (1973). There is no constitutional right, for 
example, ·to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a 
private school or join a labor union. Runyon v. McCrary, 
427 U. S. 160 (1976); Railway Mail Association v. Corsi, 326 
u. s. 88, 93-94 (1945). 
III 
We conclude that petitioner's complaint states a claim cog-
nizable under Title VII. Petitioner therefore is entitled to 
Because Senator Cotton's amendment failed, it is unclear to what extent 
Congress shared his concerns about selecting partners. In any event, his 
views hardly conflict with our narrow holding today: that in appropriate 
circumstances partnership consideration may qualify as a term, condition, 
or privilege of a person's employment with an employer large enough to be 
covered by Title VII. 
11 For example, Congress expressly exempted the United States Govern-
ment, Indian tribes, and certain agencies of the District of Columbia, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e(b)(1), small businesses and bona fide private membership 
clubs, § 2000e(b)(2), and certain employees of religious organizations or as-
sociations, § 2000e-l. Congress initially exempted certain employees of 
educational institutions, § 702, 78 Stat. 255 (1964), but later revoked that 
exemption. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 3, 86 Stat. 
103. 
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her day in court to prove her allegations. The judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
' 
.ittvrtmt <qoud qf t4t ~tb Jtzdtll' 
'~lht,glfingtou, ~. <If. 2ll c?~ ~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
May 2, 1984 
Re: No. 82-940 Hishon v. King & Spalding 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WN • .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
No. 82-940 
May 2, 1984 
Hishon v. King & Spalding 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
·" /'
I 
f- .·! '- t l 
Copies to the Conference 
, 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.in:punu Clf!tttrl 4ff t4~  .itm: 
:.ru.ftingtcn. ~. <IJ. 21lt?~~ 
May 2, 1984 
Re: 
. II 
82-940 - Hishon v. Spalding & K1ng 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
May 4, 1984 
82-940 Hishon v. King & Spalding 
Dear Chief: 
Please ioin me. 
I probably will write a brief concurring opinion. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS O F 
.Ju:prtntt <!fo-nrl o-f tlrt ~ i'tatt.e' 
~Jri:nghtn, ~· <If. 20c?.){.~ 
' 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
May 4, 1984 
Re: 82-940 - Hishon v. King & Spaulding 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 









TO: David DATE: May 4, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Hishon 
I will give you with this memo a very rough 
dictated draft of the type of concurring opinion that I 
have in mind. 
This draft was written without an outline, and 
essentiall "off the cuff". I like the way you write, and 
therefore I would appreciate your doing such editing and 
revision as you think appropriate. 
I think it desirable to make clear how law firms 
actually operate, and to demonstrate the incompatibility 
of Title VII or of any other formalistic determination of 
the typical decisions that are made regularly in law 
firms. 
I dictated a good many rough ideas before the 
case was considered at Conference. I have not had an 
opportunity to go over these beyond a quick glance. You 
may find thoughts there that are worth adding. Some of 
what I have said may more properly go into footnotes. 
2. 
Your brief draft, that focuses on the right of 
association, could either be the first section or the last 
section of the opinion. I have focused primarily on the 
practicalities of law firm management and decision making. 
These are characteristics of the association of partners 
in the practice of law - still a personal relationship. 
I illustrate one interesting difference between 
a business corporation and a law firm. I sat on a number 
of corporate boards. Annually, and usually on the basis 
of a committee's report that probably has been written 
primarily by senior executive officers, the board makes 
promotions, salary increases and other important personnel 
decisions. Among the many differences in this decision-
making process is that when officers recommend salary 
increases to the board, whether for themselves or others, 
no one's salary or compensation is reduced. Partnership 
participation works quite differently. Assume that the 
five lawyers in our Chambers were partners, each initially 
with a 20% interest in the profits. A year or so later 
one partner's participation is increased to 30%. The 
result is that the other partners' participation - or 
least one or more of them - would suffer a reduction. 
Therefore, decisions with respect to admission to 
3. 
partnership and thereafter with respect to division of 
profits are made in response to the question whether: if 
David Charny is admitted to the firm, or if his 
participation is increased, will the firm net profit also 
increase? 
David, I have come to the end of this particular 
cassette so I'll quit here but we can talk tomorrow. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
lfp/ss 05/05/84 HISH SALLY-POW 
Rough dictated draft before 
leaving for CAll Conference 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion holding that 
petitioner's complaint alleges a violation of Title VII, 
and that the motion to dismiss should not have been 
granted. In this case there was no written contract that 
defined the terms of the law firm's employment of 
associates, and therefore petitioner's averments entitle 
her to the opportunity to prove them. Petitioner's 
~ 
~ not allege a commitment to admit to 
p; rather, it avers a promise by the firm that 
~· 
2. 
she would be considered for partnership on a "fair and 
equal basis" within the time span that generally 
associates are so considered. 1 
I write to make clear my understanding that the 
Court's opinion does not apply to the management~he 
A 
partners of a law firm itself. The relationship between 
partners is very different from that between employer and 
employee. Although judgmental decisions are made with 
respect to both relationships, there are significant 
differences understood by every lawyer who has been a 
partner in the practice of law. 
1 Law firms customarily require a period of . 
associateship that usually ~s a prerequisite to being 
eligible to "make" partner. This rarely is an inflexible 
period, as firms vary from the norm and admit to 
partnership earlier than, or subsequent to, the customary 
period of service. Also, as the complaint recognizes, 
many firms make annual evaluations of the performances of 
associates, and ~e- frea to terminate employment on the 
basis of these evaluations. 
3. 
It is, of course, true that subjective judgments 
are made in the initial selection of associates. Although 
~~ ~ --- _ } 
" law school performance and ~xperienC'Eh <M' ~fter employmen~ 
often are the controlling considerations ~~r ~ 
qualifications frequentlyf re given weight. But the 
selection of associates creates only the relationship of 
employer/employee, and is qualitatively different in major 
respects from the ultimate choice of partners. Once the 
partnership relation is established, 2 the judgmental 
decisions embrace a wide range of intra-partnership 
subjects. 
Many if not most firms have a managing or 
2Law firms may have several categories of 
partners: salaried, salaried with bonus arrangements, and 
participating partners. When I refer to admission to the 
partnership, I make no distinction between these 
categories. 
4. 
executive committee, as does respondent, that has broad 
delegated responsibility to make initial decisions. The 
more critical decisions, such as admission to partnership, 
change of partnership status, and increases in partnership 
participation, usually are subject to approval by a 
majority in interest of all of the partner~. No business 
organization is run in this manner, nor are most 
f . 1 t h. ~ f. d . . ~ d-f~ nonpro ess1ona par ners 1ps. ~ ~aw 1rm ec1s1onsAare 
~ .to ""'"".a-"<.....-~-c..t:~· ~4 
/1) -mor€ sensitive,/\ ~ad often more difficul~ t3~an tl:lese 
~at~ee~~ine expansion policies; participation in 
~~~~. 
profits and other types of compensation; work assignments; / 
" 
approval of commitments in bar association, civic or even 
political activities; questions of billing; acceptance of 
new clients; and questions of conflicts of interest. 
The professional skill of a lawyer is by no 
means the only qualification that is considered 
particularly in determining participation in profits. 
Partnership agreements may provide specifically that 
consideration also be given to the partner's ability to 
attract and retain clients; to overall productivity; to 
~ 
5. 
contributions to the profession through bar organizations; 
and to the recognition of the firm's duty to accept 
appointment to represent indigents; rende~ublic service; 
and - finally - to a partner's spirit and attitude within 
the firm. 
It hardly need be said that these types of 
decisions cannot be measured by conventional business 
standards or by any formalistic system. Essentially, they 
are judgmental and discretionary, with the major ones 
6. 
subject to a vote of the partners. A law firm simply 
could not function if each partner had a statutory right 
to aver discrimination with respect to such decisions, and 
litigate the question with his or her partners. 
I have indicated the familiar way in which law 
firms customarily operate because to some extent even the 
initial selection of an associate, and certainly the 
decision as to partnership admission, also involve some of 
these personal judgments. For example, a capacity to 
bring clients to a law firm is essential to its ongoing 
viability . of ~ firm. Similarly, qualities of personality 
and character that inspire confidence and retain clients 
are important, though difficult to judge absent a period 
of association. Few law firms remain static; they either 
tend to increase their clientele or gradually lose it. 
7. 
Accordingly, decisions that are made with respect to 
admissions to the partnership - and to some extent at the 
initial employment stage - are critical to the long-term 
ability of a firm to render quality legal service. 
In the decisions made by law firms, it is now 
widely recognized - as it should be - that neither race 
nor sex is relevant. Whatever may have been the views of 
an all-masculine partnership even a decade or so ago, 
there is no basis in the 1980s for believing that ancient 
racial prejudices or ~ misconception as to the 
capability of women to make excellent lawyers, continue to 
exist. The qualities of mind, capacity to reason 
logically, ability to work under pressure, leadership and 
the like are unrelated to race or sex. This is 
demonstrated by the success of women and minorities in law 
8. 
schools, in the practice of law, on the bench, and in 
positions of community, state and national leadership. 
Law firms - and, of course, society - are the better for 
these changes. 3 
3 rf for no other reason, the self-interest of 
a lawj irm now dictates that judgments be made 
independently of invidious considerations. 
May 5, 1984 
82-940 Hishon v. King & Spalding 
near C'hief: 
When I sent you a join note, T han int~nded men-
tioning the second sentence in the first full paragraph on 
p. 4 where you make the point that a contract need not be 
written. ~he sentence also says: 
"An informal contract of emplovment may arise 
by the simple act of handing ~ job applicant 
a shovel and providing a work place." 
I would think it is necessary to add a footnote 
that recognizes qualifications of this sweeping lang•1age. 
The statute of frauds still exists in many states. Also, it 
is important to make clear, I think, that your "shovel" ex-
ample would create only a contract subject to termination at 
any time at thP. will of either party with or without cause. 
I am sure you share my reluctance broadly to in-
vite Title VII suits. We see enough complaints that merely 
initiate a law suit in the hope that use of discovery will 
find some basis in fact for the suit. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
:~~~~-·--------=--~~.·- .. ,, ·--------~---~--~·-----.----···· -: . ~~ 
C HAMBE R S O F 
THE C HIEF .J U S TI CE 
.inp:rtmt OJonri !tf tlft ~b .itzdtg 
.. attltinght~ ~ . OJ. 2.0.;t'l-~ 
May 7, 1984 
Re: 82- 0 - Hishon v. King S Spalding 
Dear Lewis: 
Re your note of 5/5, I think it may be too late 
to "clarify" the "shovel " matter. Of course, such a 
contract is terminable at will, but I ' m sure there 
would be strong views that even that terminability would 
be subject to Title VII limits . 
I am willing to try, but it may be we should 




JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~nprtm.c <qrtnrt rtf tlr.c ~T1titdt .§d:a.t.cs 
'Jt'ra.s!ybtgfmt. lfl. <q. 2frpJI-;J 
Re : No. 82-940, Hishon v. _ King and Spalding 
Dear Chief: 
PJease join me in your recirculation of May 2. 
Sincerely, 
' 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
!·1ay 7 , 198 4 
C HAMI!IERS 01' 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.Ju.pr'"mt Of&nttt of tltt ~tb .Jtatts 
.. htslfingbnt, ~. elf. 2llc?ll-' 
May 7, 1984 
Re: No. 82-940 Hishon v. King & Spalding 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
.:§lt}trtlltt ~tttt.rf llf tqt ~ttittb .;§taftg 
'ihtsfringLm.lO. ~· 2.0bl'l-~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
May 9, 1984 
Re: No. 82-940-Hishon v. King & Spalding 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w ... J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.§n:prttttt C!}llttrlllf tfrt ~h .§taf:tg 
~a,g~ ~. Of. 2llgi'!~ 
May 10, 1984 
Re: Hishon v. King & Spalding, No. 82-940 
Dear Chief: 
This will confirm that I withdraw my separate opinion 
in the above. 
Sincerely, 
""\ ' . .;"l -./ .· 
; '--" 
W.J.B.,Jr. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
. ... _.; 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. P/~ 
~+--
I join the Court's opinion holding that 
petitioner's complaint alleges a violation of Title VII 
and that the motion to dismiss should not have been 
granted. Petitioner's complaint avers that the firm 
violated its promise that she would be considered for 
partnership on a "fair and equal basis" within the time 
span that associates generally are so considered. 1 
Petitioner is entitled to the opportunity to prove these 
1Law firms normally require a period of associateship as 
a prerequisite to being eligible to "make" partner. This 
need not be an inflexible period, as firms may vary from 
the norm and admit to partnership earlier than, or 
subsequent to, the customary period of service. Also, as 
the complaint recognizes, many firms make annual 
evaluations of the performances of associates, and are 




I write to make clear my understanding that the 
Court's opinion may not be read as extending Title VII to 
the management of a law firm by its partners. The 
relationship among partners certainly between law 
partners - differs markedly from that between employer 
and employee, and is not properly characterized as an 
employment relationship to which Title VII would apply. 
Once the partnership relation is established, the 
judgmental decisions that must be made among the partners 
embrace a wide range of subjects. The essence of the law 
partnership is the common conduct of a shared enterprise. 
The relationship among law partners contemplates that 
decisions important to the partnership will be made by 
common agreement or consent among the partners. Many 
3. 
firms, like respondent, necessarily delegate broad 
responsibility to make initial decisions to a managing or 
executive committee. The more critical decisions, such as 
admission to partnership, change of partnership status, 
and increases in partnership participation, generally are 
subject to approval by a majority in interest of all of 
the partners. 2 
Effective management of the law firm involves 
judgmental and sensitive decisions concerning such matters 
as expansion policies; participation in profits and other 
types of compensation; work assignments; approval of 
commitments in bar association, civic or even political 
activities; questions of billing; acceptance of new 
2No business organization is run in this manner, nor are 
most nonprofessional partnerships. 
4. 
clients; and questions of conflicts of interest. Such 
decisions may affect each lawyer of the firm, sometimes 
adversely. Divisions of partnership profits, unlike 
shareholders' rights to dividends, involve judgments as to 
each partner's contribution to the reputation and success 
of the firm. A partner's professional skill as a lawyer, 
even if that were measurable by some objective standard, 
would by no means be the only qualification that is 
considered in determining his or her participation in the 
firm's profits. Factors that may be considered include 
the partner's professional reputation; ability to attract 
and retain clients; overall productivity; contributions to 
the profession through bar organizations; recognition of 
the firm's duty to the community and to render public 
5. 
service; and - finally - to a partner's leadership spirit 
and attitude within the firm. 
A law firm simply could not function if each 
partner had a statutory right to aver discrimination with 
respect to these and similar judgmental decisions, and 
litigate the question with his or her partners. The 
association of partners in the practice of law is a 
personal relationship tha~ cannot be governed by the 
determinations that are made in the course of litigating 
Title VII suits. 
Respondent contends that for these reasons 
application of Title VII to the decisions of law 
partnerships raises constitutional concerns. In my view, 
no such concerns arise in this case. Title VII applies 
only to a relationship of employer and employee. A 
6. 
partner in a law firm is not an employee, and rights of 
association may be implicated. But here it is alleged 
that respondent as an employer, is obligated by contract 
to consider petitioner for partnership on equal terms 
without regard to sex. I agree that enforcement of this 
obligation, voluntarily assumed, impairs no right of 
association. 3 
3The Court's opinion properly reminds us that "invidious 
private discrimination has never been afforded 
affirmative constitutional protections." Op. at 8. This 
is not to say, however, that the enforcement of laws that 
ban discrimination will always be without cost to other 
values, including constitutional values. As I have noted, 
such laws may impede the exercise of personal judgments in 
choosing one's employees or colleagues. Impediments to 
the exercise of one's rights to choose one's associates 
may become so restrictive as to violate the rights of 
association protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 u.s. 415 (1963): 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 u.s. 449 '1958). 
With respect to laws that prevent discrimination, 
much depends in this respect upon the standards by which 
the courts scrutinize private decisions that are an 
exercise of rights of association. For example, the 
courts of appeals generally have acknowledged that respect 
for ' academic freedom requires some deference to the 
judgment of schools and universities as to the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
7. 
In the decisions made by law firms, it is now 
widely recognized - as it should be - that neither race 
nor sex is relevant. Whatever may have been the views of 
even a decade or so ago, there is no basis in the 1980s 
for believing that ancient racial prejudices or that 
misconceptions as to the capability of women to make 
excellent lawyers, continue to exist. The qualities of 
mind, capacity to reason logically, ability to work under 
pressure, leadership and the like are unrelated to race or 
sex. This is demonstrated by the success of women and 
minorities in law schools, in the practice of law, on the 
qualifications of teachers, partie,., ar ly those considered 
for tenured positions. Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 
67-68 (CA2 1980); Kunda v. Muhlenberg COllege, 621 F. 2d 
532, 54 7-548 (CA3 1980) • Cf. Rege r.ts of the University 
of California v. Bakke, 438 u.s. 265, 311-315 (1978). 
The present case, before us on a u.otion to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, does not present such 
an issue. 
8. 
bench, and in positions of community, state and national 
leadership. Law firms - and, of course. society - are the 
better for these changes. 
CHAM!!ERS 01' 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
i'nprtmt <!Iomi of tift~~~­
.. Mqtnghttt, ~. '4. 2ll.;i'l' 
May 17, 198 4 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I have a slight stylistic change that I overlooked 
sending out. The second sentence, first full paragraph on 
page 4 (line 8) was amended to read: 
"In the context of Title VII, the 
contract of employment may be written 
or oral, formal or informal; an 
informal contract of employment may 
arise by the simple act of handing a 
job applicant a shovel and providing a 
workplace." (underlined part is new.) 
Absent dissent, this will come down as scheduled 
Tuesday. 
May 17, 1984 
82- 940 Hishon v. King & Spalding 
Dear Chief: 
I have made stvlistic changes as indicated in the 
enclosed draft that I have sent to th~ printer. 
I will circulate this , but wanted you to see the 
changes. 
Incidentally , I hope you have taken a second look 
at the sentence in your opinion describing hmo~ "contracts" 
may be made. It could have a far-reachina effect in ~1983 
cases. 
Sincerely, 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-940 
ELIZABETH ANDERSON HISHON, PETITIONER 
v. KING & SPALDING 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join the Court's opinion holding that petitioner's com-
plaint alleges a violation of Title VII and that the motion to 
dismiss should not have been gianted. Petitioner's com-
plaint avers that the law firm violated its promise that she 
would be considered for partnership on a "fair and equal 
basis" within the time span that associates generally are so 
considered. 1 Petitioner is entitled to the opportunity to 
prove these averments. 
I write to make clear my understanding that the Court's 
opinion should not be read as extending Title VII to the man-
agement of a law firm by its partners. The reasoning of the 
Court's opinion does not require that the relationship among 
partners be characterized as an "employment" relationship to 
which Title VII would apply. The relationship among law 
partners differs markedly from that between employer and 
employee-including that between the partnership and its as-
1 Law finns normally require a period of associateship as a prerequisite 
to being eligible to ''make" partner. This need not be an inflexible period, 
as finns may vary from the norm and admit to partnership earlier than, or 
subsequent to, the customary period of service. Also, as the complaint 
recognizes, many finns make annual evaluations of the performances of as-
sociates, and usually are free to terminate employment on the basis of 
these evaluations. 
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sociates. 2 The judgmental and sensitive decisions that must 
be made among the partners embrace a wide range of sub-
jects. 3 The essence of the law partnership is the common 
conduct of a shared enterprise. The relationship among law 
partners contemplates that decisions important to the part-
nership normally will be made by common agreement, see, 
e. g., Memorandum of Agreement, King & Spalding, App. 
153-164 (Respondent's partnership agreement), or consent 
among the partners. 
Respondent contends that for these reasons application of 
Title VII to the decision whether to admit petitioner to the 
finn implicates the constitutional right to association. But 
here it is alleged that respondent as an employer is obligated 
by contract to consider petitioner for partnership on equal 
terms without regard to sex. I agree that enforcement of 
this obligation, voluntarily assumed, would impair no right of 
association. • 
1 Of course, an employer may not evade the strictures of Title VII sim-
ply by labeling its employees as ''partners." Law partnerships usually 
have many of the characteristics that I describe generally here. 1 (•-" 1'""'' 
3 These decisions concern such matters as participation in profits and 
other types of compensation; work assignments; approval of commitments 
in bar association, civic or political activities; questions of billing; accept-
ance of new clients; questions of conflicts of interest; retirement programs; 
and expansion policies. Such decisions may affect each partner of the 
firm. Divisions of partnership profits, unlike shareholders' rights to divi-
dends, involve judgments as to each partner's contribution to the reputa-~ 
tion and success of the firm. This is true whether the partner's participa-
tion in profits is measured in terms of points of percentages, combinations 
of salaries and points, salaries and bonuses, and possibly in other ways. 
• The Court's opinion properly reminds us that "invidious private dis-
crimination ... has never been afforded affirmative constitutional protec-
tions." Op., at 8. This is not to say, however, that enforcement of laws 
that ban discrimination will always be without cost to other values, includ-
ing constitutional rights. Such laws may impede the exercise of personal 
judgment in choosing one's associates or colleagues. Impediments to the 
exercise of one's right to choose one's associates can violate the right of as-
sociation protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Cf. 
82-940--CONCUR 
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In admission decisions made by law finns, it is now widely 
recognized-as it should be-that in fact neither race nor sex 
is relevant. The qualities of mind, capacity to reason logi-
cally, ability to work under pressure, leadership and the like 
are unrelated to race or sex. This is demonstrated by the 
success of women and minorities in law schools, in the prac-
tice of law, on the bench, and in positions of community, state 
and national leadership. Law finns-and, of course, soci-
ety-are the better for these changes. 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 
449 (1958). 
With respect to laws that prevent discrimination, much depends upon 
the standards by which the courts examine private decisions that are an 
exercise of the right of association. For example, the courts of appeals 
generally have acknowledged that respect for academic freedom requires 
some deference to the judgment of schools and universities as to the quali-
fications of professors, particularly those considered for tenured positions. 
Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60, 67-68 (CA2 1980); Kunda v. Muhlenberg 
College, 621 F. 2d 532, 547-548 (CA3 1980). Cf. Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 311-315 (1978) (opinion of JUSTICE 
POWELL). The present case, before us on a motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, does not present such an issue. 
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